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Abstract 
During the fall of 2008, the US government was faced with a financial crisis of 
unprecedented scope. Having already exercised the authority to put Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac into conservatorship in September, the stage was set for the US government to 
intervene more broadly in strained financial markets. This intervention would ultimately 
come in the form of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), which was 
passed on October 3, 2008. The main provision of EESA was the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program, or TARP, a $700 billion program initially designed to purchase troubled assets off 
the balance sheets of struggling financial institutions. Despite initially campaigning that the 
program would be used to purchase troubled mortgage-related assets, the worsening 
stress on the financial system, complexity of creating an asset purchase program, and size 
of the mortgage market caused the Treasury to announce the Capital Purchase Program 
(CPP), a program of broad-based capital injections, on October 14, 2008. Initially, the CPP 
was available to publicly traded US banks, but was expanded shortly after to include 
privately owned banks, S-corporations, and mutual banks, so long as they were based in 
the US At its launch, Treasury also solicited nine of the largest commercial and investment 
banks to enroll in the program to encourage broad adoption for banks across the country. 
These institutions would issue either preferred stock (public and private banks) or 
subordinated debt (S-corps and mutual banks) to the Treasury at rates of five percent, 
which would then increase to nine percent after five years. As subsequent programs to 
provide credit to low-income areas and small business, such as the Community 
Development Capital Initiative (CDCI) and Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) developed, 
CPP institutions were also able to refinance CPP investments into lower-cost CDCI and 
SBLF ones. A total of 707 institutions issued $204.9 billion in CPP capital to the Treasury, 
which has recovered $226.8 billion through repayments; auctions; and income related to 
dividends, interest, and warrants.  
Keywords: Global Financial Crisis, Preferred Stock, Subordinated Debt, US Capital 
Injections, US Department of the Treasury  
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At a Glance  
By the fall of 2008, the US government 
was faced with a financial crisis of 
unprecedented scope. Having already 
exercised the authority to put the 
mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac into conservatorship in September, 
the stage was set for the US government 
to intervene more broadly. This 
intervention would ultimately come in the 
form of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), which 
was passed on October 3, 2008. The main 
provision of EESA was the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program, or TARP, a $700 billion 
program initially designed to purchase 
troubled assets off the balance sheets of 
struggling financial institutions. Despite 
initially campaigning that the program 
would be used to purchase troubled 
mortgage-related assets, the worsening 
stress on the financial system, complexity 
of creating an asset purchase program, and size of the mortgage market caused the 
Treasury to announce the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), a program of broad-based 
capital injections, on October 14, 2008. 
Initially, the CPP was available to publicly traded US banks, but was expanded several times 
to include privately owned banks (November 2008), S-corporations (January 2009), and 
mutual banks (April 2009), so long as they were based in the US Institutions would issue 
either preferred stock (Public and private banks) or subordinated debt (S-corps and 
mutual banks) to the Treasury at rates of five percent, which would then increase to nine 
percent after five years. At its launch, Treasury solicited nine of the largest commercial and 
investment banks, representing 55 percent of all banking assets, to enroll in the program to 
encourage broad adoption for banks across the country. All eligible institutions could 
participate at the same terms as these nine, regardless of size or regulatory status.  
Treasury required participating banks to issue warrants to Treasury to purchase additional 
shares. It also restricted common stock dividends, executive compensation, and non-CPP 
share repurchases. Initially, Treasury was allowed to make new CPP investments through 
December 31, 2009. However, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner extended this authority to 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: “To encourage U.S. financial institutions to 
build capital to increase the flow of financing to U.S. 
businesses and consumers and to support the U.S. 
economy.” 
Announcement Date October 14, 2008 
Operational Date October 14, 2008 
Sunset Date  October 3, 2010 
Program Size $250 billion 
Usage $204.9 billion 
Outcomes $226.8 billion in revenue 
Key Features 
Tier-1 and Tier-2 assistance, 
refinancing into CDCI or 
SBLF, 9 largest participating 
US Capital Purchase Program (CPP) 
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October 3, 2010, the maximum amount allowed by EESA, to “maintain the capacity to 
respond to unforeseen threats.”  
As programs to provide credit to low-income areas and small businesses such as the 
Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI) and Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) 
developed, CPP institutions were also able to refinance CPP investments into lower-cost 
CDCI and SBLF ones and receive additional amounts of capital. The largest banks repaid 
their capital first, with 71 institutions, representing $1.79 billion in capital, holding onto 
CPP funds for more than five years. A total of 707 institutions issued $204.9 billion in CPP 
capital to the Treasury, which has recovered $226.8 billion as of February 2020 through 
repayments; auctions; and income related to dividends, interest, and warrants.  
Summary Evaluation 
The CPP, as well as other TARP bank investment programs and efforts from the Fed and 
FDIC, has been universally praised for immediately stabilizing the banking system despite 
the gravity of the crisis. Proponents attributed the CPP with providing the financial system 
with a solid foundation of capital and laying the groundwork for recovery. Academics and 
oversight institutions evaluated the CPP according to its impact on bank lending, market 
competition, and the treatment of larger institutions versus smaller ones. Despite a later 
assertion by Paulson that the “whole purpose” of the program was to increase lending, the 
impact that the CPP had on lending overall was unclear. Other critics have asserted that the 
injections themselves led to competitive distortions in the marketplace, and that larger 
institutions, such as Citigroup and Bank of America, were given much more leeway in how 
they exited the program, whereas smaller banks did not receive enough. Despite this, 
Treasury exited over 80% of its investments by the end of 2010 and made over $20 billion 
in profits from the program. The CPP has been credited in the literature as an effective 
emergency measure for stabilizing frozen US credit markets. 
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United States Context 2008 -2009 
GDP 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU  
converted to USD) 
$14,560 billion in Q4 2008 
$14,628 billion in Q4 2009 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU  
converted to USD) 
$48,383 in 2008 
$47,100 in 2009 
Sovereign credit rating  
(five-year senior debt) 









Size of banking system 
$9,938 billion in total assets in 2008 
$9,789 billion in total assets in 2009 
Size of banking system  
as a percentage of GDP 
68.3% in 2008 
66.9% in 2009 
Size of banking system  
as a percentage of financial system 
Assets equal to 30.2% of financial 
system in 2009 
Five-bank concentration  
of banking system 
44.3% of total banking assets in 2009 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
18.0% of total banking assets in 2008 
19.0% of total banking assets in 2009 
Government ownership of banking system 
0% of banks owned by the state in 
2008 
0% of banks owned by the state in 
2009 
Existence of deposit insurance 
100% insurance on deposits up to 
$100,0005 for 2007 
100% insurance on deposits up to 
$250,000 for 2010 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank, 
Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
 
 
5 The passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October of 2008 authorized a temporary 
increase of the deposit insurance threshold up to $250,000 (EESA 2008, 3799). This was made permanent on 
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Despite substantial official interventions in term funding and mortgage markets, the 
financial crisis in the US that had begun a year earlier reached a tipping point in September 
of 2008. Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank in the US, filed for 
bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, despite reporting record earnings in just January of 
that year (Wiggins, Piontek, and Metrick 2014, 2; Valukas 2010, 2). Bank CDS spreads and 
the Libor-OIS spread shot up dramatically following Lehman’s failure, and remained 
elevated until the middle of October, as shown in Figure 1.6 
Figure 1: Three-Month LIBOR-OIS Spread and Bank CDS Spreads (bps)  
Lehman’s bankruptcy caused the three large remaining investment banks—Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley, and Merrill Lynch—to seek further government support to avoid 
bankruptcy. On the same day that Lehman fell, Merrill Lynch and Bank of America agreed 
to a $50 billion merger (BoA 2008). Six days later, both Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
 
6 Bank CDS spreads, as shown in Figure 1, are equal-weighted averages of JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells 
Fargo, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs. 
825
US Capital Purchase Program Lawson and Kulam
 
 
became bank holding companies, which allowed them to obtain access to the Fed’s 
emergency lending facilities (Guha 2008).  
During this time, the Bush administration released the first iteration of its $700 billion plan, 
called the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), to buy troubled assets from financial 
institutions (Calabresi 2008). Almost immediately, policymakers critiqued the proposal for 
its lack of detail and the broad authority that it gave Treasury (Senate Banking Committee 
2008). These concerns caused TARP to fail its first vote on September 29 (Stolberg 2008; 
Bensinger 2008; US House 2008b). Stock markets crashed after the vote. The S&P 500 fell 
8.8%, its largest decrease since the October 1987 stock market crash (Jester, Nason, and 
Norton 2020; Davis 2008). After the disastrous market reaction, Congress passed the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA)—which had TARP as its 
centerpiece—on October 3 (US House 2008a). While administration officials had originally 
described the legislation as a direct asset purchase program for troubled institutions, the 
administration ultimately decided to use the funds to inject capital directly into financial 
institutions. The largest TARP program was the Capital Purchase Program (Andrews and 
Landler 2008; Paulson 2008f; Kashkari 2008a). Administration officials said they revised 
their implementation plan for TARP after concluding that they would not have had time to 
value banks’ troubled assets and, even if they had, $700 billion would not have been 
sufficient given the severity of the problems in the market (Fed 2009; SIGTARP 2009b, 12). 
Program Description 
The Treasury announced the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) on October 14, 2008, less 
than two weeks after the bill passed (Treasury 2008c). In its initial press release, Treasury 
specified that it would purchase senior preferred equity “on standardized terms” and that 
interested institutions would have until November 14, 2008, to apply (Treasury 2008c). Of 
the $700 billion in TARP funds that Congress appropriated, Treasury planned to use up to 
$250 billion for the purchase of equity (Treasury 2008c; EESA 2008, 3780). Treasury 
required interested institutions to submit applications to their federal banking regulator 
(the FDIC, Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or Office of Thrift 
Supervision [OTS]) (Treasury 2008a, 1–2).  
As part of the CPP’s first press release, Treasury noted that nine large “healthy” institutions 
had already agreed to participate “to signal the importance of the program for the system” 
(Treasury 2008c).7 Together, these nine banks, which represented about 55 percent of all 
US banking assets, obtained $125 billion in Treasury capital (GAO 2012, 7–8). These nine 
were strongly encouraged to accept the initial injections as a group, as administration 
officials believed that doing so as a group would not only eliminate stigma, but prevent 
differentiation between “strong” and “weak” banks, which could have “further 
 
7 The nine banks were, in order of investment size, Citigroup, JP Morgan, Wells Fargo ($25 billion); Bank of 
America ($15 billion); Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch ($10 billion); Bank of New York Mellon 
($3 billion); and State Street ($2 billion). Bank of America received the $10 billion given to Merrill Lynch as a 
result of a merger, completed on January 1, 2009 (SIGTARP 2009b, 20–21).  
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destabilize[ed] financial institutions and markets” (SIGTARP 2009b, 18–19). (See KDD No. 
7 for more information on this decision.)  
Two of the nine initial participants, Citigroup and Bank of America also received $20 billion 
each in preferred stock on December 31, 2008, and January 15, 2009, respectively, as part 
of the Targeted Investment Program (TIP). These preferred shares paid dividends of eight 
percent, and were given to prevent a loss of confidence that could “result in significant 
market disruptions that threaten the financial strength of similarly situated financial 
institutions” (Citigroup 2008; Fed/FDIC/Treasury 2009; Treasury 2009k). 
Throughout the course of the program, Treasury broadened the types of institutions that 
could participate. Initially, they only made funds available to publicly traded banks and 
trusts. Banks and trusts that were not publicly traded were issued a term sheet on 
November 17, 2008, while S-corporations and mutual banks received their term sheets on 
January 14, 2009, and April 14, 2009, respectively (Treasury 2008f; Treasury 2009c; 
Treasury 2009h).  
Every institution was required to issue capital that equaled at least one percent of its risk-
weighted assets (Treasury 2008b, 1). They could receive assistance up to either $25 billion 
or three percent of its risk-weighted assets, whichever was lesser (Treasury 2008b, 1). All 
securities issued to Treasury carried a face value of $1,000.  
Dividends and Interest Payments.  
Dividends or interest payments were paid quarterly. Dividends for preferred shares started 
at five percent, increasing to nine percent if a Qualified Financial Institution (QFI) had 
Treasury capital still outstanding after five years. S-corporations and mutual banks issued 
subordinated debt instead of preferred stock because they don’t issue common shares. 
Treasury set their initial interest payments higher—at 7.7 percent, rising to 13.8 percent 
after five years—to adjust for the tax-free status of these companies (Treasury 2008b; 
Treasury 2008b; Treasury 2009a; Treasury 2009b). (See KDD No. 10 for more 
information.) 
Treasury placed additional restrictions on dividends and interest payments. Dividends 
were cumulative for QFIs that issued preferred shares at the holding-company level: in 
other words, those QFIs could not pay any dividends to junior or equivalently ranked 
preferred shares until they had paid dividends (unpaid and currently due) on the 
Treasury’s preferred shares. Dividends were non-cumulative for QFIs that were not 
subsidiaries of bank holding companies. CPP recipients that issued subordinated debt faced 
similar restrictions, and were not allowed to pay dividends on any equity until they had 
paid all interest payments (Treasury 2008b; Treasury 2008e; Treasury 2009b; Treasury 
2009g). Bank holding companies that were S-corporations could defer interest payments 
on their subordinated debt for up to 20 quarters, though the interest would cumulate and 
compound (Treasury 2009b, 2). 
The term sheets required QFIs to obtain Treasury approval for any increases in dividends 
in common stock for the first three years the Treasury held QFI shares. After three years, 
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publicly traded institutions no longer needed any Treasury approval for dividend 
increases, but private institutions, S-corporations, and mutual banks still needed it to 
approve increases of over three percent until ten years had passed, or until the Treasury 
sold its investment (Treasury 2008b; Treasury 2008e; Treasury 2009b; Treasury 2009g). 
All securities issued to Treasury were nonvoting. In the event that dividend or interest 
payments were not paid for six quarters, Treasury could appoint two directors to the QFI, 
who would be required to keep the director on until dividends or interest had been repaid 
for four consecutive periods (for preferred stock), or completely repaid (in the case of 
subordinated debt) (Treasury 2008b; Treasury 2008e; Treasury 2009b; Treasury 2009g).8  
Repurchases and Redemptions 
Repurchases of any class of equity required Treasury’s approval so long as the QFI still had 
Treasury stock outstanding. Participants did not need Treasury’s consent to repurchase 
Senior Preferred shares or other capital instruments connected to benefit plans, if the 
repurchases were consistent with past business practices and relevant income tax laws. 
Similar to the dividend restrictions above, after three years, public QFIs no longer needed 
to seek Treasury approval, and for the other types of eligible institutions this restriction 
was lifted after ten years.  
Redemptions of CPP securities during the first three years required a qualified equity (or 
securities) offering that generated proceeds of at least 25 percent of the initial issue price 
of the securities. After three years, a QFI could redeem the Treasury’s stake with the 
approval of its primary federal regulator. Mutual banks did not face this restriction, and 
could redeem the subordinated debt they issued at will, subject to the aforementioned 
approval (Treasury 2008b; Treasury 2008e; Treasury 2009b; Treasury 2009g). While the 
initial term sheets prohibited exits for three years, the American Reinvestment and 
Recovery Act of 2009 (ARRA) allowed institutions that received TARP investments to repay 




8 Nonpublic QFIs who paid cumulative dividends on preferred stock were required to pay dividends from all 
missed quarters, not just the last four consecutive ones (Treasury 2009b, 4). 
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Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance 
Section 111(b) of EESA described corporate governance and executive compensation 
standards as they apply to direct purchases or investments in financial institutions. Both 
EESA and the original CPP contracts contained narrow provisions on executive 
compensation (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 392). The Bush-era Treasury primarily focused 
on stabilizing the financial system, and they believed that restricting executive 
compensation could limit participation and potentially impair its objective (Massad and 
Kashkari 2020, 392). Treasury later passed several interim final rules that expanded on 
and provided additional guidance on executive compensation post-EESA (Treasury, n.d.a). 
ARRA expanded these guidelines in February 2009.  
Senior executive officers (SEOs), initially defined by EESA as a the top five highest paid 
executives of companies that took CPP money, were the primary targets of these 
restrictions (EESA 2008, 3777). The number of SEOs that were affected gradually increased 
as the program developed, and the restrictions expanded with the passage of ARRA and as 
Treasury issued more guidance throughout the first half of 2009 (Treasury 2009i). SEOs at 
CPP recipients were generally unable to receive “golden parachute” payments, as well as 
bonuses and additional compensation, except under specific circumstances. Finally, the 
legislation and subsequent interim final rules required QFI compensation committees to 
identify features that could “lead SEOs to take unnecessary and excessive risks” and meet 
with risk officers to discuss these features. Treasury passed its last interim final rule on 
executive compensation on June 10, 2009 (Treasury 2009i). (See KDD Nos. 13 and 15 for 
more details.) 
CDCI and SBLF Conversion 
 The Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI), which was created on February 3, 
2010, allowed CPP institutions that serviced lower-income areas to convert their CPP 
capital into lower-cost CDCI capital (Treasury 2010; Webel 2013, 15–16). If a QFI was 
accepted, their current CPP capital would be exchanged, and they could be expected to 
issue additional shares up to a maximum of five percent of their risk-weighted assets 
(Treasury 2012b). The CDCI copied the CPP’s architecture while softening key payment 
factors: the CDCI decreased initial interest/dividend rates from five percent to two percent, 
delayed the step-up clauses from five years after the original investment to eight years, 
omitted the requirement on stock warrants, and increased the maximum issuance of 
government capital from three percent of risk-weighted assets to five percent (GAO 2014, 
4–5). (Further information on the CDCI can be found in Kulam [2021].) 
The Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF), established on September 27, 2010, as part of the 
Small Business Jobs Act, encouraged lending to small businesses by providing Tier-1 capital 
to qualifying community banks with assets of less than $10 billion (Treasury 2011; 
Treasury, n.d.b). Through the SBLF, community banks that received capital under the CPP 
or CDCI could refinance these investments under the SBLF, provided that they had neither 
been on the FDIC’s “problem bank” list within the last 90 days nor missed more than one 
dividend payment under the CPP or CDCI (Treasury, n.d.b, 8). Because the SBLF was not 
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established with TARP funds, participating institutions did not have to abide by the 
significantly expanded executive compensation requirements established by the ARRA 
(Treasury, n.d.b, 8). This was an important distinction, as Treasury officials at the time 
knew that these restrictions prevented smaller banks, which did not have top executive 
officers and high-level employees compensated as generously as the larger banks, from 
applying to the CPP (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 393). 
The dividend structure of the SBLF was tied to the amount of small-business lending a 
given SBLF participant did. The more a participant’s small-business lending increased after 
receiving SBLF capital, the lower its dividends would be (Treasury, n.d.b, 4).9 The program 
required CPP institutions to pay an annual “lending incentive fee” of two percent of the 
total amount of preferred stock outstanding after the fifth year of the original CPP 
investment, if the institution did not increase its small-business lending relative to how 
much it was lending prior to the SBLF investment (Treasury, n.d.b, 4–5). 
Sunset Date and End of Authority 
 Section 120 of EESA specified that the authority to purchase troubled assets and, by 
extension, inject capital, would expire on December 31, 2009 (EESA 2008, 3788). However, 
the section also specified that the Secretary of the Treasury could extend the authority to 
make new investments through October 3, 2010 (EESA 2008, 3788). Treasury Secretary 
Geithner invoked this authority in a letter to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi on 
December 9, 2009, to continue to address the ongoing housing crisis and to “maintain the 
capacity to respond to unforeseen threats” (Geithner 2009b).  
Outcomes 
Initial participation in the CPP was swift, with 213 institutions receiving approximately 
$187.5 billion in aid by the end of 2008 (Treasury, n.d.c). By the end of 2009, 707 
institutions had been accepted into the program, and Secretary Geithner had extended the 
authority to purchase equity through October 3, 2010 (Geithner 2009b).  
 
9 See KDD No. 11 for more information about the dividend structure for SBLF institutions. After four-and-a-
half years, all dividends, irrespective of lenders’ performance, would increase to nine percent (Treasury, n.d.b, 
4). 
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Of the 707 participants, 34 went into bankruptcy or receivership. Treasury, in some cases, 
“receive[d] cash or other securities, which generally [could] be sold more easily than 
preferred stock, but Treasury’s investments [were] sometimes sold at a discount” 
(Treasury, n.d.c; Treasury 2019b, 1; GAO 2016, 6). For a small number of CPP institutions, 
Treasury made ad-hoc decisions either to restructure or exchange its investment with 
other securities to help facilitate a merger. Sometimes this meant taking a discount 
(SIGTARP 2015, 12).  
This typically involved banks submitting restructuring (or recapitalization) plans to 
Treasury, who would then evaluate the plan, including any proposed discounts that 
Treasury might take. In this evaluation, Treasury received feedback from an external asset 
manager, who “interviews bank managers, gathers non-public information, and conducts 
loan loss estimates and capital structure analysis” (SIGTARP 2010, 84). Despite the 
possibility of losses, Treasury was willing to take part in these transactions because “it 
believe[d] that inaction may lead to the bank failing, resulting in a total loss to the 
taxpayer” (SIGTARP 2010, 84). 
A total of 28 institutions converted their CPP capital into CDCI capital, representing about 
$360 million. Another 137 CPP institutions opted to refinance approximately $2.21 billion 
in government capital with the SBLF (Treasury 2019b, 1). 
The nine systemically important institutions that received the first $125 billion in CPP 























Figure 2: QFIs Accepted into the CPP, monthly ($ billions) 
Source: Treasury, n.d.c. 
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the Fed’s 2009 stress test, the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP). The 
program, which “estimated future losses, revenues, and needed reserves” for 19 large 
institutions, found that five banks—Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, State 
Street, and Bank of New York Mellon—met the tests’ target capital ratios; this allowed 
them to repay their CPP capital on June 17, 2009 (SIGTARP 2011, 14). Bank of America and 
Wells Fargo repaid their CPP capital in December, 2009, and Citigroup repaid its CPP 
capital in December, 2010 (CPP Transaction Data).  
Figure 3: Repayment of CPP Funds, annually ($ billions) 
 
Source: Treasury, n.d.c. 
 
The other CPP institutions repaid their capital at a much slower rate on average, with an 
average time of repayment of 1,137 days, or over three years. Some institutions paid 
Treasury back much earlier, with the quickest repayment coming from Centra Financial 
Holdings, Inc., after just 74 days. However, CPP recipients paid back over 84% of total 
capital by the end of 2010 (Treasury, n.d.c). As of November 2019, two banks, representing 
approximately $17.4 million in Treasury stock, still have investments outstanding 
(Treasury 2019b, 1).10 
Seventy-one CPP institutions did not repay their CPP capital within five years. As a result, 
their dividends increased, as outlined in the term sheets. These 71 institutions held onto 
their capital for an average of 2,265 days, compared to 1,011 days for all other institutions. 
 
10 As of November 1, 2019, these two institutions were OneUnited Bank ($12.06 million) and Harbor 







Big 9 Repayments Repayments (Minus Biggest 9)
December 10, 2010 - Largest Nine Financial 
Institutions Complete Repayment of CPP Capital. 
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These 71 institutions accounted for less than one percent of total CPP capital, however 
(Treasury, n.d.c).  
The Treasury has received $226.4 billion, as of November 1, 2019 (see Figure 4). That 
figure includes principal repayments ($197 billion), dividend and interest payments ($19 
billion), proceeds from the sale and exercising of warrants attached to CPP term sheets ($8 
billion), and auctions ($3 billion).11  
 
Treasury had a variety of methods to exit its investments. As mentioned above, CPP 
institutions could refinance the capital into another program, such as the SBLF or CDCI. 
Treasury also began using auctions in March of 2012. This test auction, which was 
modelled after the auctions that Treasury had been conducting to sell its CPP warrants, 
received eight times as many bids as the number of securities offered. It netted over $360 
million in revenue, despite Treasury receiving less than the par value for the stock (Massad 
2012). Revenue from these auctions, of which the preferred stock of 190 institutions was 
offered, was just over $3 billion (Treasury 2019b, 1). After accounting for the various 
exchanges and refinancing initiatives, net income from the CPP was about $27.1 billion 
(Treasury 2019a).  
  
 
11 The total income shown in Figure 4 is actually $226.78 billion. However, this calculation includes the $360 
million in CPP funds that were exchanged into the CDCI. Since these shares were exchanged into another 
program, rather than simply having their properties altered by entering another program (SBLF), they were 










Repayments Auctions Dividends, Interest &
Other Income
Warrant Income
Figure 4: CPP Income Breakdown (as of November 1, 2019, $ billions) 
Source: Treasury 2019b, 1. 
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II. Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: The Capital Purchase Program was part of the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (TARP), which included capital injections, as well as housing, 
auto, and credit market relief programs. 
The program was one of the first parts of a series of interventions aimed at stabilizing 
several sectors of the struggling American economy. TARP funds were disbursed to provide 
government investment in individual institutions, such as AIG, as well as entire sectors, 
such as housing and the auto industry. However, the CPP was considered to be the 
“centerpiece” of TARP (Treasury, n.d.d; FRBSTL 2009, 1).  
Additional TARP bank investment programs included the Community Development Capital 
Initiative (CDCI), the Targeted Investment Program (TIP), the Asset Guarantee Program 
(AGP), and the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) (Treasury 2016). TARP’s 
credit market programs were the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP), the Term 
Asset Backed Loan Facility (TALF), and the SBA 7(a) Securities Purchase Program (Credit 
Market Programs). TARP’s housing programs were the Making Home Affordable (MHA) 
and the Hardest Hit Fund (HHF), as well as support for FHA refinancing efforts (Housing 
Programs). TARP also funded individual restructuring agreements for Chrysler and GM 
through the Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP). Section 136 of TARP also 
temporarily increased the deposit insurance threshold from $100,000 to $250,000; 
Congress later made the change permanent (EESA 2008, 3799).  
In total, Congress appropriated $700 billion of TARP funds in two tranches of $350 billion. 
Congress required Treasury to submit a report to Congress requesting that the second 
tranche of $350 billion be released should it be needed (EESA 2008, 3780–81). In total 
Treasury disbursed about $442 billion through TARP, with its capital injections through the 
CPP at almost $205 billion, and total assistance to banks at $245 billion (Treasury 2019a). 
2. Legal Authority (1): Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
on October 3, 2008, which gave the Secretary of the Treasury authority to 
purchase troubled assets “from any financial institution” and served as the legal 
basis for the CPP.  
Legal Authority for the Capital Purchase Program came from Section 101 of the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008, which was passed on October 3, 2008. Section 
101 states that, “The [Secretary of the Treasury] is authorized to establish the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (or ‘TARP’) to purchase, and to make and fund commitments to 
purchase, troubled assets from any financial institution…” (EESA 2008, 3767). Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve shortly decided to directly invest in the capital structure of banks 
rather than purchasing assets off their balance sheets (SIGTARP 2009b, 12). Treasury 
would allocate a total of $250 billion of the $700 billion. 
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3. Legal Authority (2): Initially, the Treasury Secretary and the Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve cited the need for broad, immediate authority to purchase 
troubled assets in campaigning for the passage of EESA, but they ultimately 
turned to capital injections as they were the “most timely, effective step to 
improve credit market conditions.” 
The Bush administration faced considerable difficulty in getting Congress to pass TARP. Its 
original proposal, which was three pages long and released on September 20, 2008, was 
met with considerable resistance from Congress and the public (Calabresi 2008). In an 
attempt to persuade lawmakers and the public, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke testified at the Senate Banking and Finance 
Committee on September 23 (Senate Banking Committee 2008). 
Paulson testified that the proposal would be “the single most effective thing we [could] do 
to help homeowners, the American people and stimulate our economy” (Paulson 2008a). 
Bernanke backed the Treasury’s “proposal to buy illiquid assets from financial institutions” 
(B. S. Bernanke 2008, 4). He said the program would create liquidity, promote price 
discovery, and restore confidence in the broader system (B. S. Bernanke 2008, 4). Paulson 
and Bernanke worked in tandem, with Bernanke “provid[ing] the academic gravitas” and 
Paulson “argu[ing] passionately that [TARP] was the most effective way to recapitalize the 
banking system” (Jester, Nason, and Norton 2020). The two officials expressed an urgent 
need for intervention, with Paulson acknowledging the importance of post-crisis regulation 
(B. S. Bernanke 2008, 4; Paulson 2008a, 2). Paulson described TARP as an asset purchase 
program rather than a recapitalization program. In his testimony to the House Financial 
Services Committee the next day, he explicitly stated that the program “is not a spending 
program. It is an asset purchase program, and the assets which are bought and held will 
ultimately be resold with the proceeds coming back to the government” (Paulson 2008b).  
The initial reaction from lawmakers was negative. Sen. Chris Dodd, who chaired the Senate 
committee, called the original proposal “stunning and unprecedented in its scope—and 
lack of detail...” Dodd said the program would not do anything to help homeowners. He 
articulated mistrust towards having the Treasury hold so much power. “[It] is not just our 
economy that is at risk but our Constitution as well” (Senate Banking Committee 2008, 3). 
Much of the criticism from lawmakers centered around the proposal’s lack of detail, its 
focus on rescuing financial institutions rather than homeowners, and the lack of 
punishment for the financial institutions that would be receiving TARP aid (Senate Banking 
Committee 2008).  
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The original proposal sparked some public outrage, such as over a thousand protestors 
rallying outside of the New York Stock Exchange (Bensinger 2008). Senators Sherrod 
Brown, Barbara Boxer, and Diane Feinstein reported that their offices alone received over 
60,000 emails, calls, and letters about the proposal, most of which were decidedly against it 
(Stolberg 2008; Bensinger 2008). A poll by Pew found broad support for a government 
intervention; Gallup found that a majority of Americans supported Congressional action, 
but in a form different from Paulson’s proposal (Kohut and Parker 2008; Newport 2008).  
The House of Representatives failed to pass EESA on September 29, 2008 (US House 
2008b). In a public statement following the vote, Paulson expressed his disappointment, 
stating that the government’s toolkit was “substantial but inefficient” to address the 
continued stress (Paulson 2008c). Financial markets reacted extremely negatively after the 
vote, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropping 777 points and the S&P 500 falling 
8.8 percent, with over $1 trillion in value being lost (Jester, Nason, and Norton 2020; Davis 
2008). 
In the aftermath of the failed vote, Paulson’s aides expressed privately that capital 
injections would likely be necessary to combat the crisis. Paulson agreed and told President 
Bush capital injections, not large-scale asset purchases, would be the best way forward 
(Jester, Nason, and Norton 2020, 213-214).  
The Senate passed a revised bill on October 1, and on October 3, Congress passed the 
Senate version and President Bush signed it into law (US House 2008a). After the 
successful vote, Paulson reiterated the Treasury would provide “regular updates” in 
regular press releases and speeches (Paulson 2008d). From October 3 to October 14, the 
day the CPP was announced, the Treasury published updates chronicling the shift in its 
thinking on October 6, 8, 11, and 13. Paulson’s statements on October 8 are the first place 
where he mentions verbatim that the authority granted to Treasury under EESA allowed it 
to inject capital into financial institutions (Paulson 2008e). A day later, it was reported that 
capital injections “[had emerged] as one of the most favored new options being discussed 
in Washington and on Wall Street” (Andrews and Landler 2008). The language in the 
subsequent updates on October 11 and 13 indicate that capital injections were a serious 
option that Treasury was considering, despite initially campaigning for asset purchases 
(Paulson 2008f; Kashkari 2008a).12 
In its first press release on October 14, Treasury specified that the program was 
“voluntary,” but that nine financial institutions had also already agreed to participate, 
which “signal[ed] the importance of the program for the system.” Treasury explicitly stated 
that these nine were healthy, and that they would participate “on the same terms that will 
 
12 Paulson’s remarks at the International Monetary and Financial Committee meeting on October 11, 2008, 
outlined five key areas of Treasury’s response, with one of them being strengthening the capital of financial 
institutions (Paulson 2008f). In his remarks before the Institute of International Bankers, Neel Kashkari 
specified that Treasury was “designing a standardized program to purchase equity in a broad array of 
financial institutions,” and that the program would be voluntary and attractive to healthy institutions 
(Kashkari 2008a). 
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be available to small and medium-sized banks and thrifts across the nation” (Treasury 
2008c). (For more detail on these nine banks, see KDD No. 7.) 
In an update made to the public on November 12, 2008, Paulson addressed the decision to 
avoid using TARP funds for asset purchases, stating that, “At the time, we believed that 
[asset purchases] would be the most effective means of getting credit flowing again” 
(Paulson 2008g). He described how the continuously deteriorating conditions leading up 
and subsequent to the passage of EESA made those at Treasury realize that an asset 
purchase program “would take time to implement and would not be sufficient given the 
severity of the problem” (Paulson 2008g). Ultimately, Paulson stated, capital injections 
were the “most timely, effective step to improve credit market conditions” (Paulson 
2008g). 
4. Governance/Administration: Section 104 of EESA established the Financial 
Stability Oversight Board, which oversaw the activities of the CPP and other 
TARP programs, as well as the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program, which conducted independent reviews. The Congressional 
Oversight Panel and the Government Accountability Office also oversaw TARP. 
Section 104 of EESA established the Financial Stability Oversight Board (FSOB) to review 
the policies implemented under section 101. Those policies included reviewing “the 
appointment of financial agents, the designation of asset classes to be purchased, and plans 
for the structure of vehicles used to purchase troubled assets…” (EESA 2008, 3770–71). 
The FSOB was also responsible for examining the effects that programs made under section 
101 had on “assisting American families in preserving home ownership, stabilizing 
financial markets, and protecting taxpayers” (EESA 2008, 3771). 
The Board had the following members: 
• The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
• The Secretary of the Treasury 
• The Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
• The Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and 
• The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 
Additionally, the Board was required to report to Congress, as well as the Congressional 
Oversight Panel at least quarterly to discuss the matters described above. Section 
116(a)(2) of EESA also stipulated that GAO would be another oversight authority (EESA 
2008, 3784). 
The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or SIGTARP, was 
established through section 121 of EESA. The Special Inspector General was to be 
appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, and was responsible for 
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“coordinat[ing] audits and investigations of the purchase, management, and sale of assets 
by the Secretary of the Treasury…” (EESA 2008, 3788). SIGTARP did this by collecting the 
following information: 
• Descriptions of categories of troubled assets purchased 
• Listings of assets that fell into the aforementioned categories 
• Explanations of the reasons for purchasing said assets from the Secretary of the 
Treasury  
• Listings of the financial institutions that the troubled assets were purchased 
from 
• Listings of, and “detailed biographical information” on the people hired to 
manage these troubled assets 
• Estimates on the total number and value of troubled assets, how much remained 
with the Treasury, how much had been sold, and the profit or loss incurred from 
said sales (EESA 2008, 3788–89). 
According to its mission statement, SIGTARP “is a federal law enforcement agency and is an 
independent watchdog protecting taxpayer dollars that fund TARP” (SIGTARP 2018, 3). 
SIGTARP reported to Congress about its supervisory activities twice a year, audited various 
TARP programs, and conducted and reported on investigations of misconduct for TARP 
recipients (SIGTARP, n.d.). SIGTARP’s quarterly reports generally consisted of assessments 
of various components of the program, such as the CPP, as well auto and housing industry 
support programs (SIGTARP 2010). SIGTARP reports included detailed recommendation 
sections, informed by the audits and investigations it conducted, and the reports also 
provided detailed tables of the implementation status of each of these recommendations 
(SIGTARP 2014, 313–36).  
The Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) was another crucial component of TARP 
oversight. Created on the same day that TARP was passed, COP’s primary function was to 
“review the current state of the financial markets and the regulatory system” through the 
submission of regular and special reports to Congress (EESA 2008). The COP was 
responsible for drafting reports every 30 days to support its analysis on: 
• the general use of authority provided in EESA by the Secretary of the Treasury, 
including with respect to contracting and administration;  
• the impact of purchases made under the EESA on financial markets and financial 
institutions; 
• the extent to which the information available on the transactions made by 
programs under EESA has contributed to market transparency; 
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• the effectiveness of foreclosure mitigation efforts, and the effectiveness of the 
program with respect to minimizing long-term costs to the taxpayer and 
maximizing taxpayer benefit (EESA 2008, 3791). 
Additionally, EESA required that the COP submit a Special Report on Regulatory Reform by 
January 9, 2009. This report was expected to analyze the effectiveness of the current 
financial regulatory framework at overseeing its participants and protecting consumers, as 
well as make recommendations on how to fill any existing regulatory gaps. These gaps may 
include areas where consumer protection is lacking or those where financial market 
participants that may be outside of the current regulatory perimeter operate and should 
become subject to it. In its approximately two and a half years of operation, the COP held 
hearings and collected testimony from high-level officials, such as Treasury Secretary Tim 
Geithner, as well as published 29 reports on the impacts of key TARP initiatives. Much of 
COP’s analysis was informed by the functions listed above, with the Panel asking questions 
about the more immediate, stabilizing effects of TARP, as well as longer-form impacts, such 
as how TARP recipients were structuring their business and policies after receiving aid 
(COP 2008, 3). Other reports, such as those about specific firms like GMAC and AIG, as well 
as Treasury’s conduct with smaller CPP banks, were also published (COP, n.d.). In this way, 
Congress was able to provide another layer of feedback to Treasury in how they managed 
still-outstanding investments, while providing guidance on what to do for future initiatives.  
The COP was disbanded on April 3, 2011, after releasing its final report. In it, the Panel 
explained that, while TARP alone was not responsible for the economic recovery, “TARP 
quelled the immediate panic and helped to avert an even more severe crisis” (COP 2011, 
152). However, COP did cite concerns about moral hazard, stigma, and a lack of 
transparency. TARP, and by extension the CPP, was “one of the most thoroughly scrutinized 
government programs in US history” (COP 2011, 160–61).  
5. Individual Participation Limits: The total size of the CPP was $250 billion, with 
specified minimums and maximums for participating institutions.  
Despite the varied schedule in announcement dates and capital characteristics, all four 
classes of institutions had the same individual minimums and maximums for participation. 
If accepted into the program, all participating institutions were required to issue eligible 
securities at a minimum of one percent of their risk-weighted assets. However, no 
institution could issue qualifying capital up to the lesser of 1) $25 billion and 2) three 
percent of its risk-weighted assets (Treasury 2008b; Treasury 2008e; Treasury 2009b; 
Treasury 2009g).  
6. Funding: The CPP was funded via Congressional appropriations authorized for 
Treasury’s use under the Troubled Asset Relief Program. 
Congress authorized a total of $700 billion of TARP funds. However, Treasury could freely 
disburse only $350 billion, and the president was required to return to Congress with a 
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report asking to disburse the remaining $350 billion in funds, should they be necessary 
(EESA 2008, 3780).13 Treasury allocated $250 billion to the CPP from these appropriations. 
This authority lasted until October 3, 2010, or two years after the date of the passage of 
EESA. After this point, Treasury was not able to make new commitments under TARP 
(Treasury OFS 2010, 14). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, passed on July 21, 2010, reduced this original commitment from $700 billion to $475 
billion (Dodd-Frank 2010, 2133). 
7. Communication: Participation in the CPP was voluntary, but the Treasury 
convinced nine of the largest banks to participate in the program to encourage 
broader participation and stabilize the system. 
Prior to its official release of the details of the CPP, Paulson and a group of high-level 
government officials arranged a meeting on October 13, 2008, with the heads of nine of the 
largest US banks.14 At the time, these institutions held about 55 percent of all US banking 
assets, and agreed in part to participate “to signal the program’s importance to the stability 
of the financial system” (GAO 2012, 7). They were selected because government officials 
viewed them as “systemically important” due to their size, scope of business, and 
interconnectedness in the broader economy (SIGTARP 2009b, 14–15). Although Treasury 
claimed in its initial announcement of the CPP that these institutions were healthy, other 
reports suggest that there were internal concerns about the health of the nine, and that 
protecting them would help protect a “system that was viewed as being vulnerable to 
collapse” (SIGTARP 2009b, 17). At the time, Chairman Bernanke even acknowledged that 
having one of these nine institutions fail “could rapidly cause the failure of others due to 
the high degree of interconnectedness of the systemically significant institutions” 
(SIGTARP 2009b, 17). The investments are shown in Figure 5. 
  
 
13 The phrase “outstanding at any one time,” which implicitly allowed the government to re-use TARP funds, 
was removed with the passage of The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in July of 
2010. (See KDD No. 15 for more details.) 
14 The nine banks were JP Morgan, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, 
Morgan Stanley, Bank of New York Mellon, and State Street.  
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Source: Treasury, n.d.c 
The chief executives of the nine institutions were brought into a meeting at 3:00PM on 
October 13 and were told to accept the capital “for the good of the country,” and in less 
than four hours all nine executives had pledged to take the investment (SIGTARP 2009b, 
18–19). According to SIGTARP, while the injections were initially framed as voluntary, 
Treasury Secretary Paulson later stated that, “if necessary, the government would make 
clear to the nine executives that they had no choice but to take the money” (SIGTARP 
2009b, 18–19). This was done because the government believed that having the 
institutions all take the capital together would mitigate potential stigmatization issues by 
eliminating the distinction between “weak” institutions that took the capital and stronger 
ones that did not need it (SIGTARP 2009b, 18–19). The involvement of these banks was 
leaed a day before the CPP’s official announcement (Landler 2008). 
841
US Capital Purchase Program Lawson and Kulam
 
 
8. Eligible Institutions (1): Initially, public and non-public banks were eligible for 
the CPP, but in early 2009 Treasury made S-corporations and mutual banks also 
eligible.  
Institutions that wished to apply had to do so by applying through their primary federal 
banking regulator, and bank holding companies were required to apply to their supervisor 
as well as the regulator that monitored the largest depository institution it controlled. 
Public institutions had until 5 p.m. on November 14, 2008, to submit applications 
(Treasury 2008e). The details for privately held institutions (excluding S-corps and mutual 
banks) were released on November 17, and their application deadline was December 8, 
2008 (Treasury 2008f). The names of approved publicly traded institutions would be 
released publicly unless they could “demonstrate the harm (for example, loss of 
competitive position, invasion of privacy) that would result from public release of 
information” (Treasury 2008a, 2–3). 
Financial institutions applied to their primary federal regulator by submitting an 
application form, signed by the institution’s chief executive officer or an authorized 
designee. The form included the amount of preferred stock the institution requested; high-
level financial data, such as the amount of authorized but unissued stock; a commitment 
that the management had reviewed and agreed with the terms of the investment 
agreement; a description of any conditions in the investment agreements that the bank 
could not meet; and a description of any mergers, acquisitions, or other capital raisings that 
were pending or under negotiation (FDIC/Fed/OCC/OTS, n.d.). 
Treasury initially released the term sheet and documentation for publicly traded 
institutions and later published the details for private financial institutions, S-corporations, 
and mutual banks after expanding CPP eligibility. While non-public banks had their 
participation details released about a month after their public counterparts, S-corps and 
mutual banks did not get the necessary documents to participate until January and April of 
2009, respectively (Treasury 2008f; Treasury 2009c; Treasury 2009h).15 Treasury also 
released sets of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) for each of the types of institutions 
eligible for the CPP, which primarily addressed concerns around institutional 
requirements, Tier-1 or Tier-2 eligibility of government capital (depending on whether it 
was preferred stock or subordinated debt), as well as the publicity of individual 
participants (Treasury 2008a; Treasury 2008d; Treasury 2009a; Treasury 2009f).  
According to the term sheets disseminated by Treasury at the outset of the program, a 
Qualifying Financial Institution (QFI), could not be a foreign bank, foreign savings 
association, foreign Bank Holding Company (BHC), or foreign Savings and Loan Holding 
Company (SHLC). S-corporations and mutual banks were originally not included but would 
be made eligible in early 2009. Figure 6 describes the legal definitions of QFIs. 
 
15 Mutual banks are different from commercial banks in that they do not have common shareholders. They 
are owned by their members, that is, their depositors, who share in the profits. As of the end of 2018, the 
largest mutual institution holds just over $14 billion in assets, and the average mutual institution holds 
approximately $593 million in assets (FDIC 2021a). 
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Figure 6: Qualified Financial Institution (QFI) definitions 
Institution Type Qualified Institutions16 Deadline 
Publicly Traded17 1) Any US bank or savings association not controlled by 
a BHC or SLHC. 
2) Any “top-tier” US BHC. 
3) Any “top-tier” US SLHC that solely or predominantly 
engages in activities permitted for financial holding 
companies. 
4) Any US bank or savings association US SLHC that does 
not solely or predominantly engage in activities 
permitted for financial holding companies. 
November 14, 2008 
Private/Nonpublic 1) Any “top-tier” BHC or SLHC that solely or 
predominantly engages in activities permitted for 
financial holding companies and are not publicly traded. 
2) US banks or savings associations that are neither 
publicly traded nor controlled by a BHC or SLHC. 
3) US banks or savings associations that are not publicly 
traded and controlled by a nonpublic SHLC that that 
does not solely or predominantly engage in activities 
permitted for financial holding companies. 
December 8, 2008 
S-Corporations  1) Any “top-tier” BHC or SLHC that solely or 
predominantly engages in activities permitted for 
financial holding companies. 
2) US banks or savings associations that are neither 
publicly traded nor controlled by a BHC or SLHC. 
3) A US bank or savings association that is an S-corp 
subsidiary of an S-corp BHC or SLHC that does not solely 
or predominantly engage in activities that are permitted 
for financial holding companies. 
February 13, 2009 
Mutual Banks 1) Any US bank or savings association “organized in 
mutual form” and not controlled by a BHC or SLHC. 
May 14, 2009 
Source: Treasury 2008b; Treasury 2008c; Treasury 2008e; Treasury 2008f; Treasury 2009b; Treasury 2009c; 
Treasury 2009g; Treasury 2009h. 
 
16 BHC stands for Bank Holding Company. SLHC stands for Savings and Loan Holding Company.  
17 Publicly traded companies are companies 1) “whose securities are traded on a national securities exchange 
and 2) required to file, under the federal securities laws, period reports such as the annual (Form 10-K) and 
quarterly (Form 10-Q) reports with either the Securities and Exchange Commission or its primary federal 
bank regulator” (Treasury 2008e, 1). 
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9. Eligible Institutions (2): Federal regulators determined an institution’s eligibility 
for the CPP and made recommendations to the Treasury, which was responsible 
for final approval. 
In reviewing applications, primary federal regulators considered supervisory and other 
information. Treasury worked with the regulators to establish a common and streamlined 
applications process. Under this process, the primary federal regulator—or, in some cases, 
a council of representatives from each federal regulator—supervised an institution. If a 
bank had strong Capital adequacy, Assets, Management capability, Earnings, Liquidity and 
Sensitivity (CAMELS) ratings and its application was endorsed by the primary federal 
regulator then its application was sent directly to the TARP Investment Committee (Massad 
and Kashkari 2020, 399-400). For these banks, the Investment Committee would decide 
whether to recommend the bank to the Assistant Secretary of financial stability (Massad 
and Kashkari 2020, 400). Banks that did not receive this “presumptive yes” 
recommendation would have their applications sent to the CPP Council, which was 
comprised of representatives of all the bank regulators (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 400). 
The Council would then review these applications and make recommendations for the 
TARP Investment Committee, who would then make the final recommendations to the 
Assistant Secretary (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 400). Applications that were likely to be 
denied were given back to the primary regulator, who would encourage the bank to 
withdraw its application (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 400). 
On receiving preliminary approval from the Assistant Secretary, applicants had 30 days to 
submit the investment agreements and related documentation (FSOB 2008, 7–8). 
Figure 7: Federal Banking Agency (FBA) Classification for QFIs participating in the 
CPP 
QFI Classification Standards for Classification (one of the following) 
Category 1 – Presumptive Federal 
Banking Agency Approval 
(“Presumptive Yes”) 
1) QFIs with a Composite CAMELS/RFI rating of “1.” 
2) QFIs with a Composite CAMELS/RFI rating of “2” and for which 
the most recent examination rating is not more than six months 
old. The most recent exam should be conducted or confirmed by 
the Primary Federal Regulator (PFR). 
3) QFIs with a composite rating of “2” or “3” and acceptable 
performance ratios. 
Category 2 – Presumptive CPP Council 
Review 
1) QFIs with a Composite CAMELS/RFI rating of “2” and for which 
the most recent examination rating (as determined or confirmed 
by the PFR) is more than six months old and showed overall 
unacceptable performance ratios. 
2) QFIs with a Composite CAMELS/RFI rating of “3” with overall 
unacceptable performance ratios. 
Category 3 – Presumptive FBA Denial 
1) QFIs with a Composite CAMELS/RFI rating of “4.” 
2) QFIs with a Composite CAMELS/RFI rating of “5” 
Source: SIGTARP 2009a, 26. 
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10.  Capital Characteristics: Initially, institutions would issue perpetual nonvoting 
senior preferred shares to Treasury, with warrants to purchase additional 
common stock. S-corporations and mutual banks issued subordinated debt. 
In its first term sheet, released on October 14, 2008, Treasury specified that the capital that 
it purchased had to have the following characteristics: 
Figure 8: Capital Characteristics for types of QFIs 
Institution 
Type 
Type of Capital Regulatory 
Capital Status 
Seniority Dividends 
Publicly Traded Perpetual Preferred 
Stock 
Tier 1 Senior to all common, 
pari passu with 
preferred unless 
specified 
5% (<5 years) 





Tier 1 Senior to all common, 
pari passu with 
preferred unless 
specified 
5% (<5 years) 
9% (>5 years) 
S-Corporations 30-Year Subordinated 
Debt 
Tier 2, Tier 1 if 
at a holding 
company 
Senior to all equity, 
subordinated to other 
obligations and 
depositors18 
7.7% (<5 years) 
13.8% (>5 
years)19 
Mutual Banks 30-Year Subordinated 
Debt 
Tier 2 Senior to all equity, 
subordinated to other 
obligations and 
depositors 
7.7% (<5 years) 
13.8% (>5 
years) 
Sources: Treasury 2008b; Treasury 2008e; Treasury 2009b; Treasury 2009g. 
As mentioned in the Evaluation section, CPP’s effect on bank lending was a popular method 
of examining its overall impact. Treasury Secretary Paulson even stated that “The whole 
reason for designing the program was so many banks would take it, would have the capital, 
and that would lead to lending. That was the whole purpose” (FCIC 2011, 375). Despite this 
assertion, Treasury did not, in the term sheet or subsequent regulation, require banks to 
use this capital for lending purposes. Treasury began publishing a variety of lending 
reports and data to help track new lending after an institution had received CPP funds. 
Treasury explained that “lending is clearly one of the most important ways CPP recipients 
 
18 For holding companies that were issuing subordinated debt to Treasury for itself or a subsidiary, the debt 
was required to be “subordinated to senior indebtedness of the [institution]” (Treasury 2009b, 2). 
19 For S-corporations that were holding companies and qualified for the CPP, interest could be deferred for up 
to 20 quarters, but any unpaid interest would cumulate and compound. If the holding company opted to defer 
interest payments, then they were not allowed to pay dividends on any equity until the deferral ended 
(Treasury 2009b, 2). 
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can deploy this additional capital, as it affects Americans directly” (Treasury 2009e, 1). 
Treasury published individual bank lending reports as well as “monthly lending and 
intermediation snapshots,” which were targeted at the largest banks and done so Treasury 
could provide public analysis of the situation by targeting a section of banks that 
represented the majority (about 75%) of bank holding company assets in the country 
(Treasury 2009e, 2).  
Dividends 
All capital issued to Treasury was sold at $1,000 per instrument.20 If necessary, Treasury 
could agree to purchase the senior preferred shares with higher liquidation preference per 
share to accommodate the QFI’s available authorized preferred shares; in this scenario, 
Treasury could make the QFI appoint a depositary to hold the senior preferred shares and 
issue depositary receipts (Treasury 2008b; Treasury 2008e). Dividends and interest 
payments were cumulative, paid quarterly, and at rates varying from 5 to 7.7 percent, 
depending on the type of institution and how long it had held the capital for. All rates were 
equal on a normalized tax basis. After five years, step-up clauses in the term sheets would 
kick in, increasing the dividend or interest rates as high as 13.8 percent, depending on what 
category the QFI was in.21 For institutions that took preferred equity and were not 
controlled by a holding company, their dividends were non-cumulative (Treasury 2008b; 
Treasury 2008e).  
Dividend Restrictions 
 For all classes of QFIs, dividends on junior or equivalently ranked equities were prohibited 
from being paid out or declared while the QFI still had Treasury capital outstanding. QFIs 
were also subject to certain restrictions on repurchases and redemptions, as well 
(discussed in KDD No. 11). Additionally, any increases in common dividends were required 
to be approved by Treasury so long as the government’s investment remained outstanding, 
or until three years had passed. After the third anniversary of the capital injection, publicly 
traded QFIs could raise common-stock dividends by any amount without Treasury’s 
consent, while the other three types of QFIs could only do so to a maximum of three 
percent. If an institution still had Treasury capital outstanding after 10 years, it was 




20 Preferred stock had a liquidation preference of $1,000, and subordinated debt was sold with a par value of 
$1,000 (Treasury 2008b; Treasury 2008e; Treasury 2009b; Treasury 2009g). 
21 S-corporations and mutual banks paid 7.7 percent in quarterly interest for the first five years of holding 
Treasury capital, then 13.8 past five years. However, the after-tax effective rates of their interest payments 
were five and nine percent, respectively. Thus, they paid the same effective amount in interest as publicly 
traded and privately owned QFIs (Treasury 2009b, 2). 
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 Treasury also received 10-year warrants to purchase common stock, additional preferred 
shares, or additional subordinated debt depending on the type of QFI it had an agreement 
with. The terms of these warrants are summarized in Figure 9. The warrants for both 
publicly traded QFIs and mutual banks included Reduction clauses, which stated that, if the 
QFI had not paid back Treasury’s investment by the end of 2009, then the number of 
securities underlying the warrants would be reduced to half of the total amount of 
Treasury’s initial investment (Treasury 2008b, 5; Treasury 2009g, 5). 
For publicly traded institutions, the warrants could also be exchanged for “senior term debt 
or another economic instrument or security of the QFI such that [Treasury] is 
appropriately compensated for the value of the warrant…” (Treasury 2008b, 5). Treasury 
had the option to make this substitution if the QFI ceased to be publicly traded, or if a 
shareholder vote to issue enough common stock to cover the exercising of the warrant had 
not passed within 18 months (Treasury 2008b, 5).  
In the fourth quarter of 2008, the Treasury immediately exercised all warrants for 
preferred shares in each privately-held QFI that received a CPP investment. Treasury did 
not require banks classified as community development financial institutions to issue 
warrants as a condition for a CPP investment (FSOB 2008, 9). 
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Figure 9: Characteristics of CPP Warrant by Type of QFI 
Institution Type Stock Obtained Exercise Price Voting Term 
Publicly Traded Purchase common stock 
equivalent to 15% of the 
market price of the 
Preferred stock on the 
date of investment.  
Market price22 of 
common stock on 
date of Preferred 
investment (20-
day trailing avg.). 
Nonvoting common 
stock, if exercised.  
10 years. 
Private/Nonpublic Purchase net shares of 
preferred stock with 
liquidation preference 
equal to 5% of the 
Preferred amount 
purchased on the date of 
investment.  
$0.01 per share, 
“or such greater 
amount as the 
charter may 
require…” 
Same terms as original 
preferred. Nonvoting 
and ability to elect 
directors if six dividend 
payments are missed. 
9% dividends per 
annum. 







Purchase a “number of 
additional Senior 
Securities” equal to 5% of 
the amount purchased on 
the date of investment. 
$0.01 per note 
representing a 
Warrant Security. 
Same terms as original 
Senior Securities. 
Nonvoting and ability 
to elect directors if six 
dividend payments are 
missed. 13.8% 
dividends per annum.23 





Sources: Treasury 2008b; Treasury 2008e; Treasury 2009b; Treasury 2009g. 
Voting Rights. 
In both cases of preferred stock or subordinated debt, Treasury would have no voting 
rights other than those in instances where i) instruments more senior to their own were 
being issued, ii) the rights of their equity or debt were being amended, or iii) a merger, 
exchange, or similar transaction took place that would affect the rights of their investment 
(Treasury 2008b; Treasury 2008e; Treasury 2009b; Treasury 2009g). 
 
22 Treasury set the initial exercise price of the warrants equal to the market price of the common stock at the 
date of the original investment (calculated on a 20-trading-day trailing average) (Treasury 2008b, 4). If the 
QFI failed to achieve its stockholders’ consent, then Treasury would reduce the exercise price by 15 percent 
of the original price every six months following the original investment, with a limit of 45 percent of the 
original exercise price (Treasury 2008b, 4). 
23 The Senior Securities issued to Treasury had an interest rate of 7.7% for the first five years, then 13.8% 
after. These rates, while higher than the dividends that public and private banks paid before and after five 
years, respectively, equated to 5% and 9%, assuming a tax rate of 35% (Treasury 2009g, 2). 
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11.  Other Conditions: CPP agreements did not specifically outline debt-
restructuring agreements. However, outstanding CPP investments were 
restructured if a participant went into bankruptcy or receivership. 
As of October 2019, 34 institutions that received CPP investments were either undergoing 
or had gone into bankruptcy or were in receivership. Institutions in receivership would 
have their assets taken over and subsequently marketed and sold to make their creditors 
whole (FDIC 2014, 26). When referencing this category of institutions, the GAO reported 
that, “When [CPP] investments are restructured, Treasury receives cash or other securities, 
which generally can be sold more easily than preferred stock, but Treasury’s investments 
are sometimes sold at a discount” (GAO 2016, 6). For a small subset of CPP institutions, 
Treasury “would determine whether it would exchange or restructure the Government’s 
shares to facilitate a merger or acquisition of the TARP bank and whether or not it would 
take a discount,” though this was done on an ad-hoc basis (SIGTARP 2015, 12).  
Repurchases and Redemptions 
In effect, the government’s investment subordinated all other holders of equity, though 
holders of senior and subordinated debt still ranked senior to the senior preferred equity 
that the government held. Redemption of Treasury’s investment in all types of QFIs except 
for mutual banks required a qualified equity offering (or qualified securities offering in the 
case of subordinated debt) in which the institution raises additional Tier-1 or Tier-2 capital 
in private markets of at least 25% of the original issue price of Treasury’s investment. For 
mutual banks, redemptions could be done at any time, provided they obtained approval 
from their federal banking regulator (Treasury 2008b; Treasury 2008e; Treasury 2009b; 
Treasury 2009g). 
The term sheets also required QFIs that issued preferred equity to obtain Treasury 
approval for any repurchasing of shares that were either senior or non-government. QFIs 
that issued subordinated debt had to seek Treasury’s approval for any repurchases of 
equity. However, if a QFI still had CPP investments outstanding after ten years, then they 
were no longer required to obtain Treasury approval for repurchases or undergo a 
qualified equity offering for redemptions (in the cases of publicly traded and nonpublic 
QFIs). Publicly traded institutions were only required to wait three years before these 
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CDCI and SBLF Conversion 
 The Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI), which was created on February 3, 
2010, allowed certain CPP institutions to convert their CPP capital into lower-cost CDCI 
capital (Treasury 2010; Webel 2013, 15–16). In order to be eligible for this conversion, CPP 
institutions needed Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI) certification. 
CDFIs are financial institutions that seek to generally expand economic opportunities in 
underserviced and low-income areas (Treasury 2012b; CDFI Fund, n.d.). If a QFI was 
accepted, their current CPP capital would be exchanged, and they would be expected to 
issue additional shares up to a maximum of five percent of their risk-weighted assets 
(Treasury 2012b). 28 institutions had $362 million in CPP investments refinanced through 
the CDCI. 
The Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF), established on September 27, 2010, as part of the 
Small Business Jobs Act, was a program that “encourage[d] lending to small businesses by 
providing Tier-1 capital to qualifying community banks with assets of less than $10 billion 
(Treasury 2011; Treasury, n.d.b). CPP institutions that met that requirement could apply to 
the SBLF to have their Treasury capital refinanced provided that they were 1) not on the 
FDIC’s problem-bank list and had not been on that list for the last 90 days, and 2) had 
missed a maximum of one dividend payment for CPP or CDCI preferred shares (Treasury, 
n.d.b, 8). 
While the terms of the SBLF in many ways mirrored the CPP and CDCI, the dividend 
structure was tied to the amount of small business lending a given SBLF participant did. 
The more a participant’s small business lending increased after receiving SBLF capital, the 
lower its dividends would be (Treasury, n.d.b, 4).24 This incentive structure was amplified 
by an annual “lending incentive fee” of two percent of the total amount of preferred stock 
outstanding that would trigger if the institution did not increase its small business lending 
relative to its baseline amount after two and a half years in the program. The fee would 
apply starting on the fifth anniversary of the original CPP investment and each subsequent 
quarter (Treasury, n.d.b, 4–5). Because the SBLF was not a TARP program, many TARP 
restrictions, such as those on executive compensation, did not apply (Massad and Kashkari 
2020, 392-393). This was particularly appealing to institutions eligible for the SBLF, as 
these restrictions did not vary based on the size of the bank and thus disproportionately 
impacted smaller banks with senior executives and officers who were not as generously 
paid (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 392-393). For these firms, the expanded restrictions 
“reached well down the organizational chart” and may have contributed to a lack of 
participation in the program or quicker repayment of the funds by smaller institutions 
(Massad and Kashkari 2020, 392-393). The SBLF was an alternative with less onerous 
restrictions, provided that a bank could continue to increase its lending (Massad and 
Kashkari 2020, 393). SBLF conversions were quite popular, with a total of 137 QFIs 
 
24 There were still step-up clauses present in the CPP/CDCI to SBLF term sheet, however. After the first nine 
quarters, dividend rates would increase to a maximum of seven percent (from five percent for the first nine 
quarters). After four-and-a-half years, all dividends, irrespective of lenders’ performance, would increase to 
nine percent (Treasury, n.d.b, 4).  
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refinancing approximately $2.2 billion in Treasury capital through the SBLF through 
November 1, 2019 (Treasury 2019b, 1). 
12.  Fate of the Board of Directors: Treasury had the ability to appoint two directors 
to institutions that did not pay interest or dividends for six quarters. 
If dividends were not paid for six quarters (consecutive or not) then Treasury would have 
the option to elect two directors, with this right expiring after dividends had been paid for 
four consecutive quarters (Treasury 2008b, 3).25 After Treasury had received these 
backlogged payments, institutions were under no obligation to keep the government-
appointed directors, but could choose to do so (Treasury 2012a). If five dividend payments 
were missed, however, Treasury would request permission from the institution to send 
observers “to help determine how to best exercise its contractual rights to nominate up to 
two directors” (Treasury 2012a). If multiple institutions required directors to be 
nominated, Treasury prioritized them based on the size of its investment, with large 
institutions receiving attention first. Specifically, they stated that, “Treasury [would] focus 
first on institutions where [its] investment exceeds $25 million” (Treasury 2012a). 
13.  Executive Compensation: Treasury included executive compensation and 
corporation governance restrictions modeled after those originally passed in 
EESA in its agreements with applicants.  
Section 111 of EESA outlines executive compensation restrictions and corporate 
governance standards. Specifically, Section 111(b) describes these standards as they apply 
to direct purchases or investments in financial institutions. Section 111(b)(2) specified that 
there would be: 
• “limits on compensation that exclude incentives for senior executive officers of a 
financial institution to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the 
value of the financial institution during the period that the Secretary holds an 
equity or debt position in the financial institution; 
• a provision for the recovery by the financial institution of any bonus or incentive 
compensation paid to a senior executive officer based on statements of earnings, 
gains, or other criteria that are later proven to be materially inaccurate; and 
• a prohibition on the financial institution making any golden parachute payment 
to its senior executive officer during the period that the Secretary holds an 
equity or debt position in the financial institution” (EESA 2008, 3777). 
 
25 For non-publicly traded applicants, the right to elect directors ended when dividends had been paid for 
four consecutive periods (for non-cumulative preferred) or when all prior dividends had been paid (for 
cumulative preferred) (Treasury 2008e, 4). For S-corps and mutual banks, the right to elect directors ended 
when interest was paid for all prior missed quarters (Treasury 2009b, 4; Treasury 2009g, 3). 
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Senior executive officers (SEOs) were defined by EESA as the top-five highest paid 
executives of companies that took TARP money (EESA 2008, 3777). Treasury passed 
several interim final rules that provided additional guidance on executive compensation 
post-EESA, as well (Treasury, n.d.a). Treasury passed one of these rules on October 20, 
2008, which gave additional clarification to the three rules outlined in Section 111 of EESA 
with respect to CPP investments.  
The rule required that a financial institution accepting CPP funds had to identify features 
that may “lead SEOs to take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the 
financial institution” and ensure that they are not encouraged to take these risks. 
Compensation committees had a maximum of 90 days to make these reviews, and were 
required to meet at least once a year with senior risk officers to discuss these policies 
(Kashkari 2008b, 7–8). The regulation also required that any bonuses and incentive 
compensation paid to SEOs were subject to a clawback if they were earned through 
inaccurate financial statements or “any other materially inaccurate performance metric 
criteria” (Kashkari 2008b, 9). For the third and final provision under Section 111(b)(2), 
golden parachutes were defined as “any payment in the nature of compensation to (or for 
the benefit of) a SEO made on account of an applicable severance from employment to the 
extent that the aggregate present value…equals or exceeds an amount equal to three times 
the SEO’s base amount” (Kashkari 2008b, 9). The restrictions were narrow, as the Bush-era 
Treasury team believed that additional restrictions might have discouraged participation, 
and they were not the purpose of the program (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 392). Treasury 
officials Neel Kashkari and Tim Massad later recounted, “We viewed our highest priority as 
preventing a financial collapse, even if that meant we would take substantial criticism for 
our actions” (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 392-393). 
Treasury announced significantly harsher restrictions on executive compensation on 
February 4, 2009, by distinguishing between institutions that required “exceptional 
assistance,” such as AIG, and Bank of America and Citigroup, and institutions participating 
in “generally available capital access program[s],” such as the CPP (Treasury 2009d). 
Institutions that received exceptional assistance faced even greater restrictions, such as a 
significant increase in golden parachute prohibitions (top 10 SEOs) and restrictions (one-
year salary for next 25 highest-paid employees), as well as more restrictive limits to SEO 
compensation. 
For generally available capital access programs, SEO compensation was further limited to 
$500,000 in total yearly compensation, though this could be waived with “full public 
disclosure and [a] shareholder vote” (Treasury 2009d). The clawback provisions also 
applied to the next twenty highest paid employees, in addition to the top five. Golden 
parachutes were further restricted to one year’s compensation, instead of three. The 
“exceptional assistance” distinction was the only one that Treasury made, which meant that 
the restrictions applied to all banks participating in the CPP regardless of size (Treasury 
2009d). ARRA further expanded the restrictions and required the Secretary of the Treasury 
to retroactively analyze the bonuses and retention awards paid to each TARP recipient’s 
top-25 most highly compensated employees to determine whether the payments were 
inconsistent with the purpose of EESA and TARP or were contrary to the public interest 
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(ARRA 2009). If a TARP recipient was found to be in violation of this standard, then the 
Secretary would negotiate with them “for appropriate reimbursements to the federal 
government” (ARRA 2009). The Treasury Secretary delegated the responsibility for this 
“Look Back” review to the Special Master for TARP executive compensation (Feinberg 
2010, 2). The decision to significantly increase these restrictions across the board may 
have contributed to both a lack of participation at smaller banks and quicker repayment of 
TARP investments—regardless of whether the institution had replacement investments 
lined up (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 392-393). 
Treasury published their last Interim Final Rule on June 10, 2009. The final rule limited 
bonuses paid to SEOs to one-third of total compensation, with the number of SEOs affected 
by this limit increasing based on the amount of CPP aid given.26 The $500,000 limit 
specified in the February guidance would be amended to “link compensation to long-term 
firm value” by allowing additional compensation over $500,000, providing that this was in 
the form of long-form, restricted stock (Treasury 2009i). The final rule also included the 
creation of a Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation, and further accountability 
for the Board of Directors of TARP recipients (Treasury 2009i). 27  
Kenneth Feinberg, who was appointed as the Special Master, was responsible for reviewing 
compensation plans at firms receiving “exceptional” assistance in such a way that 
“maximize(s) long-term shareholder value and protect(s) taxpayer interests” (Treasury 
2009i).28 This review was done with six factors in mind: 
• Risk. Compensation plans generally should not encourage SEOs to take 
unnecessary risks. This includes incentives that reward employees for short-
term or temporary increases in value or performance.  
• Taxpayer return. Compensation structures should reflect the need for the 
entity to remain competitive and repay TARP obligations. 
• Appropriate allocation. The composition of the compensation should be 
appropriately allocated with respect to the amount that is provided in salary, 
equity, executive pensions, et cetera. 
• Performance-based compensation. An “appropriate portion” of compensation 
should be performance-based. This should be determined through specific 
 
26 Institutions that received over $500 million in assistance had their top-five highest paid executives, as well 
as the 20 next highest paid, affected by the one-third of total compensation limit. 
27 A number of the provisions laid out in the June 10 Interim Final Rule, such as the one-third limit on total 
compensation, as well as the number of SEOs and employees affected by executive compensation restrictions 
based on total TARP aid received, were originally passed via Section 111 of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA). The June 10 Interim Final Rule implemented and clarified these 
restrictions. 
28 In addition to approving compensation agreements, the Special Master was also responsible for reviewing 
compensation that was paid prior to the passage of ARRA, as well as negotiating reimbursements for these 
where relevant (Treasury 2009i).  
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metrics that encompass individual performance as well as company-wide or 
specific business unit performance. 
• Comparable structures and payments. Compensation structures should 
generally be consistent with structures for persons in similar roles at similar 
entities, including those that are similarly financially distressed. 
• Employee contribution to TARP recipient value. The compensation plan 
should reflect the value that the current or prospective contributions of the 
employee is providing to the TARP recipient (Feinberg 2010, 4-5). 
To the extent that two or more of these principles may be inconsistent with one another 
when evaluating a specific compensation plan, the Special Master was afforded discretion 
in determining the relevant weight of these conflicting principles (Feinberg 2010, 5). 
Treasury specified that institutions that received exceptional assistance included AIG, 
Citigroup, Bank of America, as well as automakers such as GM and Chrysler (Treasury 
2009i). Institutions that participated in the CPP did not fall under this category (Treasury 
2009i). 
14.  Exit Strategy (1): The original CPP terms included three-year prohibitions on 
repayments, which were removed by ARRA in 2009, but Treasury did not have 
an explicit exit strategy. Later, Treasury began using auctions to exit its 
investment under CPP in May of 2012. 
The preferred stock issued to Treasury by banks (both public and non-public) was 
perpetual life, whereas the subordinated debt issued to them from S-corps and mutual 
banks had a 30-year term (Treasury 2008b, 2; Treasury 2008e, 2; Treasury 2009b, 2; 
Treasury 2009g, 1). However, the initial terms for CPP preferred stock only allowed 
repayment for the first three years if CPP capital was replaced by private capital, as the 
Bush-era Treasury wanted the financial system to fully recover before banks began 
repaying the loans (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 408). 
Ultimately, these restrictions were removed with the passage of ARRA. The Obama-era 
Treasury team, led by Tim Geithner, believed that making institutions “investable” again by 
convincing private investors that it was safe to return to the market, was the correct 
approach (Clark, Kabaker, and Sachs 2020, 257). Simply put, the Geithner-era Treasury 
focused on restoring confidence (Clark, Kabaker, and Sachs 2020, 257). To do this, the 
Treasury released a Financial Stability Plan on February 10, 2009, designed to “address the 
uncertainty, troubled assets and capital constraints of our financial institutions as well as 
the frozen secondary markets that have been the source of around half of our lending for 
everything from small business loans to auto loans” (Geithner 2009a). The most significant 
component was a comprehensive, public stress test for banking institutions (including 
holding companies) with over $100 billion in assets. The Plan also outlined a 
comprehensive government capital backstop—called the Capital Assistance Program 
(CAP)—to increase confidence and act as a bridge to private capital (Geithner 2009a; 
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Treasury 2009l). (Further details on the SCAP and CAP programs can be found in Lawson 
[2021].29) 
Though Treasury did not specify a timeline for CPP, the American Reinvestment and 
Recovery Act (ARRA), passed on February 17, 2009, enabled TARP recipients to repay their 
CPP funds earlier than what was permitted by the CPP’s original terms. Initially, recipients 
could not repay Treasury without first completing a qualified equity offering within a 
specified minimum period (Treasury 2012a). In contrast, ARRA section 7001 required 
Treasury30 to permit a recipient to repay the CPP funds: (1) upon the participant’s request 
and (2) subject to primary regulator’s consultation and approval—irrespective of a 
completed qualified equity offering or the waiting period. Otherwise, all the previous terms 
and conditions for redemption still applied, as described in KDD No. 11. 
In a letter written to Congress in December 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner stated that 
the CPP “is effectively closed,” and that the only commitments for capital injections would 
be “to provide capital to small and community banks, which are important sources of credit 
for small business” (Geithner 2009b). At the same time, Geithner reiterated that, despite 
limiting its new commitments, the government should maintain an “adequate financial 
stability reserve” in case conditions further worsened (Geithner 2009b). In terms of CPP 
investments, Geithner stated that they would be managing them, “in a commercial manner 
and [would] dispose of them as soon as practicable” (Geithner 2009b).  
Section 120 of EESA stated that the authority to purchase troubled assets (and by 
extension, inject capital), would expire on December 31, 2009 (EESA 2008, 3788). 
However, the Secretary of the Treasury could extend this authority up through two years 
from the enactment of EESA (EESA 2008, 3788). On December 9, 2009, Treasury Secretary 
Tim Geithner made this extension to “enable us to continue to implement programs that 
address housing markets and the needs of small businesses, and to maintain the capacity to 
respond to unforeseen threats…” (Geithner 2009b). This authority expired on October 3, 
2010, at which point Treasury began the wind-down of its TARP investment programs 
(Treasury OFS 2013, 4). 
From this point on, CPP was largely in a wind-down phase, with 649 of 707 institutions 
remaining in the program at the end of 2009, and the vast majority of these were 
institutions with less than $100 million in assets (SIGTARP 2015, 11). At the beginning of 
2010, 74 CPP institutions had already missed dividend or interest payments. This number 
 
29 See “The U.S. Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) and Capital Assistance Program (CAP)” in 
The Journal of Financial Crises, Volume 3, Issue 3. 
30 This portion of the ARRA amended section 111 of EESA. Subsection (g), titled “No Impediment to 
Withdrawal by TARP Recipients,” read thereafter:  
“Subject to consultation with the appropriate Federal banking agency… the Secretary shall permit a TARP 
recipient to repay any assistance previously provided under the TARP to such financial institution, without 
regard to whether the financial institution has replaced such funds from any other source or to any waiting 
period, and when such assistance is repaid, the Secretary shall liquidate warrants associated with such 
assistance at the current market price.” 
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would continue to grow as the program went on, despite the program approaching 
profitability (SIGTARP 2015, 11).  
Generally, the Treasury wished to exit its TARP investments as quickly as possible, subject 
to the following principles: 
• “Promote taxpayer investments and maximize overall investment returns within 
competing constraints; 
• Promote financial stability and prevent disruption of financial markets and the 
economy; 
• Bolster market confidence to increase private capital investments; and 
• Dispose of the investments as soon as practicable, in a timely and orderly 
manner that minimizes the impact on the market and economy” (Massad and 
Kashkari 2020, 409-410). 
On May 3, 2012, Treasury announced a strategy to more quickly exit its investment from 
the 343 remaining banks (Massad 2012). Despite nearly half of the total number of 
institutions still involved in the program, Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability Tim 
Massad stated that, of the $245 billion that they had invested in the capital structure of the 
banking system, Treasury had recovered $264 billion.31 Most of the remaining institutions 
were “smaller, community lenders” that were having a more difficult time attracting 
private capital. Massad discussed three options that Treasury was planning to exit its 
involvement: 
• Repayments. This was the most common method in which institutions exited the 
CPP (Treasury 2013, 7). According to Treasury, the majority of the remaining 
CPP institutions were unlikely to exit the program in this way. Treasury even 
stated, “In order for the investment to be considered high-quality capital for 
regulatory purposes, we could not require a bank to repay Treasury on a specific 
timeline” (Massad 2012). 
• Restructurings. As discussed above, a “handful” of participants had already 
approached Treasury about restructuring their investment, usually within the 
context of a merger or plan to raise private capital. Treasury only agreed to these 
if “the terms represent[ed] the best deal for taxpayers under the circumstances.”  
• Auctions and sales. Treasury had already auctioned off some of the warrants 
associated with its investments for a profit and had conducted a test auction of 
preferred stock in March of 2012. The auction, which received “eight times as 
many bids as the number of securities offered,” suggested that this was a 
 
31 The $245 billion figure includes $40 billion invested into both Citigroup ($20 billion) and Bank of America 
($20 billion) as part of the Targeted Investment Program (TIP). 
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beneficial way for the government to exit as it would attract private capital to 
replace their investment (Massad 2012).  
The auctions ultimately had mixed results, with the vast majority (70%) of auctioned CPP 
investments being bought by large, private fund investors that were “unknown to the 
banks and not from the banks’ communities” (SIGTARP 2015, 14–15). SIGTARP raised 
some concerns about how some buyers may have bought these shares at steep discounts 
ranking from 1% to 90%, accusing others of flipping shares back to the banks at a premium 
to what Treasury received and citing a few cases where smaller institutions were 
apparently unable to, or unsuccessful at, repurchasing their own shares at auction 
(SIGTARP 2015, 17). However, one former Treasury official highlighted that the fact there 
was flipping does not necessarily undermine the results of the auction. The same 
commentator emphasized that Treasury recovered $3 billion from auctions—a small 
portion of the total $227 billion recovered from all CPP investments. Treasury officials at 
the time kept non-public information tightly concealed, worked to not prematurely disclose 
a sale or auction to avoid market participants “front running,” or trading against them, and 
worked with bank regulators to ensure that regulatory ownership restrictions were 
observed (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 410-414). 
As of October 2019, only two institutions have about $17.4 million in CPP investments 
outstanding (Treasury 2019b, 1). Of the $204.9 billion that Treasury invested, they 
obtained approximately $226.4 billion in repayments, dividend payments, and interest 
income for a profit of about $27.1 billion (Treasury 2019a). See Figure 4 for a complete 
breakdown of this calculation. 
Figure 10: CPP Funds Outstanding ($ billions) 
  







Oct-2008 Oct-2010 Oct-2012 Oct-2014 Oct-2016 Oct-2018
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15.  Exit Strategy (2): Treasury disposed of CPP warrants through exercise (non-
public QFIs) or independent valuation and sale (public QFIs). 
For privately-held QFIs, Treasury received warrants to purchase preferred shares or debt 
and had exercised all of them upon closing the initial investment by the fourth quarter of 
2008 (Treasury 2009j). For publicly traded QFIs, Treasury received warrants to purchase 
their common stock; when publicly traded QFIs exited the CPP by repurchasing their 
shares, they also had the contractual right32 to repurchase the warrants at fair market 
value. According to a former Treasury official, Treasury’s sale of CPP warrants was 
important for returning profits to taxpayers because the derivative securities offered long-
term equity upside exposure on the public’s CPP investments. Balancing taxpayers’ 
interests with the need to exit its CPP positions “as quickly as practicable,” Treasury 
followed specific protocol for the valuation, negotiation, and sale of its CPP warrants 
(Treasury 2009j). 
Broadly, the disposition process went as follows: (1) within 15 days of full repayment, the 
bank communicated its estimate of fair market value to Treasury; (2) within 10 days of 
receipt, Treasury separately estimated fair market value and accepted or objected to the 
bank’s estimation; (3) if Treasury objected and could not agree with the bank’s estimation, 
each party hired an independent appraiser to conduct separate valuations of fair market 
value, and the appraisers attempted to agree on fair market value; (4) if the appraisers did 
not agree, a third appraiser would be hired, and fair market value would be a “composite 
valuation” of the three independent appraisals (Treasury 2009j). 
To determine the fair market value of the options contracts, Treasury officials relied on 
three valuation approaches: market prices, internal financial modeling, and independent 
assessments from external financial agents (Treasury 2009j; Jarrow 2009). A former 
Treasury official described the valuation process as occasionally difficult because some of 
the warrant markets were opaque and illiquid, given their unusually long term (10 years) 
and lack of comparable securities. Additionally, options-pricing models rely on inputs (ex: 
interest rates and volatility) that are challenging to forecast one decade into the future. 
(See Jarrow [2009] for more discussion of Treasury’s models, inputs, modifications, and 
justification.) 
 
32 If the publicly traded QFI did not request to repurchase its warrants after repurchasing the CPP securities, 
Treasury sold the warrants via auctions over the course of several months (Treasury 2009k). 
858
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 3
 
 
16. Funding/Executive Compensation: The American Reinvestment and Recovery 
Act, as well as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
decreased TARP’s total size and broadened its restrictions on executive 
compensation. 
The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) passed on February 17, 2009, 
amended EESA in several key ways, though it primarily broadened EESA’s executive 
compensation and corporate governance restrictions. Title VII of ARRA further restricted 
bonus payments made to SEOs based on information that was “materially inaccurate” from 
the five highest paid executives to 20, as well as increasing the number of employees that 
golden parachute payment prohibitions applied to (ARRA 2009, 517–18).  
ARRA also restricted, “any bonus[es], retention award[s], or incentive compensation during 
the period in which any obligation arising from financial assistance provided under the 
TARP remains outstanding” (ARRA 2009, 518). SEOs were prohibited from receiving these 
bonuses based on the size of Treasury’s investment. Despite these substantial restrictions 
on any bonuses and awards, they did not apply retroactively. Specifically, ARRA said that 
these prohibitions “shall not be construed to prohibit any bonus payment required to be 
paid pursuant to a written employment contract executed on or before February 11, 2009” 
(ARRA 2009, 404). This portion of the legislation was highly controversial and was what 
allowed the controversial decision by AIG to pay out $165 million in bonuses to its 
executives (Thatcher 2009, 25).  
Figure 11: Summary of ARRA CPP Thresholds for Executive Compensation 
Restrictions 
TARP Aid Amount Number of SEOs Restricted (ARRA) 
Less than $25,000,000 Only the most highly compensated employee. 
Between $25,000,000 and $250,000,000 Five most highly compensated employees, or more at the 
discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Between $250,000,000 and $500,000,000 All senior executive officers and the 10 next most highly 
compensated employees, or more at the discretion of the 
Secretary of the Treasury. 
More than $500,000,000 All senior executive officers and the 20 next most highly 
compensated employees, or more at the discretion of the 
Secretary of the Treasury. 
Source: ARRA 2009, 517-518. 
In June of 2009, Treasury released a final rule on executive compensation that codified and 
implemented these provisions from ARRA, as well as earlier guidance issued on the subject 
of executive compensation and corporate governance (Treasury 2009i). (See KDD No. 13 
for details on Treasury’s earlier guidance.) 
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The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, passed on July 21, 2010, 
included the “Pay It Back Act.” This act had three key features that affected TARP: 
• A decrease in the amount authorized under TARP from $700 billion to $475 
billion (Dodd-Frank 2010, 2133). 
• A removal of the phrase, “outstanding at any one time” from all subsections of 
Section 115(a), which removed the implicit authority that the Secretary of the 
Treasury to reuse TARP funds after assets were sold (EESA 2008, 3780; Dodd-
Frank 2010, 2133; Webel 2013, 10).  
• A limitation on the usage of TARP funds for programs that were initiated 
subsequent to June 25, 2010 (Dodd-Frank 2010, 2133). 
The temporary increase in the maximum deposit insurance amount to $250,000 was made 
permanent in Section 355 of Dodd-Frank, as well (Dodd-Frank 2010, 1540). The decrease 
in the maximum TARP authorization in the act was only relevant for a couple of months, as 
Treasury’s authority to make new investments under TARP expired on October 3, 2010.  
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 SIGTARP’s analysis, while broadly congratulating the Treasury on how well it did on 
recovering the hundreds of billions that it had invested into the banking system, outlined 
three key problems. SIGTARP first noted that, despite owning shares in hundreds of banks, 
Treasury’s role changed dramatically from a “very public and active” one to that of a 
“passive, private investor” in how it managed its investments in smaller banks. In 
particular, Treasury’s “extraordinary” assistance to Citigroup, such as offering it additional 
capital through the TIP and the large ringfence loss-sharing agreement, as well as the 
“careful and orderly” way in which it liquidated its holdings, contrasted starkly with some 
of the methods it used to exit its investment in smaller banks (SIGTARP 2015, 1–2).  
This asymmetric treatment was echoed in criticism of TARP’s mandate—to protect and 
promote stability in the financial system. Treasury was also required to fulfill goals such as 
“protect[ing] home values, life savings, retirement [and college] funds, preserv[ing] 
homeownership, and promot[ing] jobs and economic growth” (SIGTARP 2015, 2–3). 
SIGTARP felt that, unlike the extensive aid provided to larger institutions, Treasury could 
have acted more aggressively to support the constituents who funded TARP rather than 
“forcing smaller community banks out of the program owing money to private parties” 
(SIGTARP 2015, 3). These acquisitions by private parties would be a centerpiece of its final 
criticism: Treasury’s exit strategy for the CPP banks that remained after 2009. 
SIGTARP reported that, after the largest banks had exited the program, “Treasury stopped 
working hand-in-hand with Federal Banking regulators and receiving confidential 
information related to the health of the banks” despite there still being a large amount of 
bank failures and having done so with the larger CPP banks (SIGTARP 2015, 13–14). Per 
the report, Treasury did very little to monitor the health of these smaller institutions, and 
instead “only relied on the decision of the Federal banking regulator as to whether it could 
exit the banks and then auctioned the bank off immediately” (SIGTARP 2015, 13). This 
specific point may have been a deliberate choice by Treasury. Treasury staff would notify 
other bank regulators when they planned to sell one of their investments, but they did not 
engage in any sort of information sharing even if it would have been beneficial because “the 
principle of keeping supervisory information confidential was more important” (Massad 
and Kashkari 2020, 413).  
Additionally, accounts from Treasury officials themselves show that transparency and 
accountability were central to their operations. They retained two accounting firms—one 
to “establish and document internal controls for each program as it was built” and another 
to serve as an internal auditor for all the transactions (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 414). 
They also provided “extensive additional reporting and information beyond what was 
required by law,” such as all program documentation forms, executed program contracts 
(including those with third parties), as well as daily TARP updates breaking down the 
amounts disbursed and recovered for each program (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 416).  
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These auctions were a particularly prominent point of criticism by SIGTARP, as the body 
felt as though Treasury “gave up oversight of the financial health of these institutions and 
of being able to impact most of the communities in which these banks play important roles 
to ensure that the other purposes of TARP are met…” (SIGTARP 2015, 14). In many cases, 
Treasury would auction off its investments in banks that were struggling to make dividend 
payments or attempting to negotiate restructurings, repurchases, or suspensions of step-up 
clauses with them. These smaller banks attempted to negotiate with Treasury in the same 
way that larger banks had successfully done, but with worse results.  
70% of auctioned CPP banks had their shares acquired by Private Funds, while only 7% of 
these shares were repurchased by 45 banks that had issued them (SIGTARP 2015, 14–15). 
These banks often purchased them at discounts of up to 40%. The banks that now had 
large, private funds as some of their principal investors often tried to buy the shares back 
quickly because the new stakeholders “[were] not generally the typical investor in a 
community bank such as an individual or entity from that community who has a vested 
economic interest in the economic health of that community” (SIGTARP 2015, 17). Finally, 
SIGTARP reported that, in some cases, banks were able to repurchase these shares after 
Treasury had sold them at a loss just months later (SIGTARP 2015, 18). Total proceeds 
from the auctions totaled about $3 billion, compared to nearly $227 billion recovered. 
SIGTARP’s criticisms generally focused on the disparate treatment of Treasury’s towards 
smaller, non-systemic banks. However, the nonvoting characteristics present in all CPP 
investments indicates that Treasury did not intend to be a “public and active” investor, as it 
only had voting rights when it exercised warrants attached to the preferred stock 
investments (SIGTARP 2015, 1). One of the core reasons that the Treasury wanted to use 
preferred stock was because it was nonvoting and would mitigate concerns that the 
government would be a controlling or significant shareholder in several large banks (Jester, 
Nason, and Norton 2020, 216-217). Treasury’s decision to publicly announce the 
participation of the “Big 9” was designed to encourage smaller banks to participate on the 
same terms on which the larger banks were participating. (See KDD No. 7 for more 
discussion of their participation in the CPP.) 
GAO 
 The US Government Accountability Office (GAO), which “examines how taxpayer dollars 
are spent and provides Congress and federal agencies with objective, reliable information 
to help the government save money and work more efficiently, authored a number of 
reports on both the CPP and TARP more generally (GAO, n.d.). In a report released in March 
of 2012, GAO expressed concerns about the institutions that remained in the CPP. Despite 
Treasury only having $16.7 billion in CPP investments outstanding at that point, “a growing 
number of the remaining institutions have missed scheduled dividend or interest payments 
or appeared on the FDIC’s problem bank list” (GAO 2012, 13). GAO reported that “the 
number of institutions missing dividend or interest payments increased steadily from 8 in 
February 2009 to 158 in November 2011 (GAO 2012, 14). This analysis was corroborated 
by the fact that, in general, these remaining institutions were financially weaker, less 
profitable, and held riskier assets, even compared to those that had not participated in the 
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program at all (GAO 2012, 19–29). In order to better assess these weaknesses, GAO 
recommended that Treasury conduct additional analysis on remaining CPP participants 
rather than lump their performance together with those that had already exited (GAO 
2012, 30).  
Similarly to SIGTARP’s analysis, GAO also criticized Treasury’s use of auctions to help exit 
its CPP investments. CPP institutions were notified by Treasury that they would be part of 
an upcoming auction and were required to submit documents ranging from prospectus 
settlements and underwriting agreements (for publicly traded banks) to additional 
disclosures. To bid on their own shares, these institutions also had to obtain permission 
from their federal banking regulator. However, these institutions had “a number of 
concerns with the process,” which included rushed and expensive documentation 
preparation, as well as heavier burdens placed on them by Treasury if they wished to 
repurchase their own shares.33  
Treasury had its fair share of issues with TARP’s oversight bodies: the COP, SIGTARP, the 
GAO, and the Financial Stability Oversight Board (FinSOB) (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 
418). These four bodies had very similar responsibilities that “created layers of duplication 
and put enormous demands on our staff. At times, it made implementation of the program 
more difficult” (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 418). The oversight bodies rarely coordinated 
their efforts, which led them to produce duplicate or highly similar reports and analysis 
and then propose “different and conflicting” recommendations (Massad and Kashkari 2020, 
419). Furthermore, SIGTARP alone had more full-time equivalent employees than the 
Office of Financial Stability had from 2012 onwards. These factors led key figures—such as 
Timothy Massad and Neel Kashkari to conclude that TARP had been the subject of 
excessive oversight. 
Bank Lending and Risk-Taking 
 CPP’s effect on bank lending was a popular method of examining its overall impact. Black 
and Hazelwood (2013) examine the lending behavior of 81 banks, 37 of which received 
TARP funds. Larger and medium-sized TARP banks after receiving funds showed an 
increase in the risk profile of their Commercial and Industrial (C&I) loans compared to 
those of non-TARP banks (Black and Hazelwood 2012, 10–13). Smaller banks (<$2.5 billion 
 
33 These burdens included unclear guidance from Treasury on how the opt-out bid, which was a bid that 
could be submitted by the institution to opt-out of pooled auctions and immediately repurchase their own 
shares, was used. The opt-out bid was used as a floor price for many pooled auctions, which frustrated 
institutions who reported that they “would have submitted a higher bid in order to win the auction and retain 
ownership if they had known that the opt-out bid would be used this way” (GAO 12-301, 14). Institutions 
wishing to repurchase their own shares were required to disclose their intent to bid, as well as the amount of 
capital they were raising to bid on their shares, to the SEC, which raised the prices of the shares and gave 
other bidders additional information (GAO 2012, 14–15). Finally, institutions wishing to repurchase their 
own shares were often not able to match the highest bid to repurchase their own shares, as Treasury felt that 
doing so “would make other bidders less competitive, and could, in turn, discourage potential bidders from 
participating” (GAO 2012, 15). 
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in assets), however, appeared to reduce their risk profile after receiving funds. In addition 
to this, the authors found no evidence to suggest that TARP banks of any size increased 
their C&I lending volume, and in fact decreased it immediately following the injections, 
though these levels would return to normal after about a year (Black and Hazelwood 2012, 
15–16).  
Li (2014) discussed both the lending and riskiness channels as well, but found that CPP 
injections increased bank loan supply by 6.36%, or just over $400 billion (Li 2013, 2). The 
quality of these loans after receiving CPP capital and increasing lending did not decrease in 
a meaningful way, unlike what was found in the Black and Hazelwood paper (Li 2013, 24). 
Banks that were more politically connected, such as those that had executives as Federal 
Reserve Bank (FRB) directors or were located in states that had representatives on the 
House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, were significantly 
more likely to receive TARP funds (Li 2013, 17–20). Accounts from officials that ran the 
program, however, say that they made efforts to ensure decision-making processes were 
free from political influence, so much so that “all congressional calls and input were 
directed to the assistant secretary and kept away from those reviewing applications” 
(Massad and Kashkari 2020, 401). 
Duchin and Sosyura (2014) corroborated similar results to those found in Black and 
Hazelwood, finding “no significant effect of [the] CPP on the volume of credit origination at 
approved banks, compared to their denied peers” (Duchin and Sosyura 2013, 2). Despite 
there being no significant effect on the volume of loans, the riskiness of loans made by CPP 
banks increased by 5.4 percent relative to banks that did not receive assistance. However, 
the authors also found that this behavior translated to smaller banks as well, although the 
relationship was much stronger at larger banks (Duchin and Sosyura 2013, 12). This 
difference was negligible prior to the capital injections. However, these differences did not 
show up in approved banks’ regulatory ratios, as both low-yield and high-yield mortgages 
carried the same risk weight, despite the former being less risky than the latter (Duchin 
and Sosyura 2013, 11).   
Puddu and Waelchli (2015) analyzed the bank lending channel of CPP assistance with 
respect to small business lending at the county level. The authors found that participation 
in the CPP increased small business loan originations by 19 percent (Puddu and Walchli 
2014, 17). The authors then examined the county-level effect of this lending, specifically 
using unemployment and poverty rates as proxies for temporary and chronic economic 
distress, respectively. The positive effect on small business loan origination was only 
significant in counties that had high unemployment, which the authors explain intuitively 
makes sense, as a program like the CPP “[was] useless in counties that suffer from more 
persistent economic issues (high poverty)” (Puddu and Walchli 2014, 18–19).  
Harris, Huerta, and Ngo (2013) examined the operating efficiency of CPP banks versus 
those that did not receive capital using a variety of “bank soundness variables” such as 
Tier-1 capital ratios, return on assets, funding costs, and others (Harris, Huerta, and Ngo 
2013, 89–90). According to their models, CPP banks became less efficient after the capital 
injection compared to non-CPP banks, which the authors attribute to the intervention 
864
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 3
 
 
“reduc[ing] the incentives of bank managers to adopt best practices that improve asset 
quality” (Harris, Huerta, and Ngo 2013, 98, 102). The authors largely believed that the CPP 
exacerbated behaviors consistent with moral hazard, as evidenced by the behavior of 
participating banks prior to and after the capital injections (Harris, Huerta, and Ngo 2013, 
102). 
Thus, there is a mixed consensus on the CPP’s effects on bank lending, as well as loan 
riskiness after receiving capital. Scholars that found a negligible effect on bank lending 
suggested that the banks that received assistance merely originated riskier loans, without 
increasing the volume. In a discussion with the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC), 
Paulson even stated that “The whole reason for designing the program was so many banks 
would take it, would have the capital, and that would lead to lending. That was the whole 
purpose” (FCIC 2011, 375).  
Bank Competition 
 In addition to the conclusions drawn about bank risk-taking as a result of receiving CPP 
aid, there was also literature that centered on potential competitive advantages by CPP 
recipient banks. In a July 2010 report, the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) cited the 
concern for consolidation in the “generally unhealthy” small bank sector. The COP reported 
that “the question of concentration was, however, a side issue in late 2008 when TARP was 
first developed,” though Paulson’s and Neel Kashkari’s remarks at the time indicate that 
they did not believe that this was a problem (COP 2010, 44–45). The Panel noted that, at 
the time of the report, there had been 860 bank-to-bank purchases and mergers since 
2006, with the concentration in the financial system increasing and giving the remaining 
banks “a freer hand in setting terms for their depositors, possibly resulting in higher fees 
and more restrictions on account holders” (COP 2010, 46, 48). 
Koetter and Noth (2014) explored these concerns by analyzing the likelihood of 
government intervention (in this case, the CPP) on interest rates as a measure of price 
competition. Specifically, they look at the expectations of receiving a bailout on the 
behavior of banks that were sound but did not receive capital. These unsupported banks 
could be at a competitive disadvantage in relation to those that received funding, and thus 
may be required to pay out “higher risk premiums….which reduced margins at given loan 
rates or could encourage higher risk taking by the banks in an attempt to increase expected 
returns and thus margins” (Koetter and Noth 2014, 995). By analyzing the probability of a 
bailout through political factors such as “the voting behavior on TARP, party membership, 
and membership on the financial subcommittee,” they were able to determine that, while 
bailout expectations were correlated with pricing behavior, the effect on loan rates was 
only about 4.5 basis points (Koetter and Noth 2014, 1018). Additionally, these small effects 
became insignificant after 2010, suggesting that potential of capital injections for sound 
banks did not have any lasting competitive effects (Koetter and Noth 2014, 1018–20). 
Berger and Roman (2014a) explored the potentially distortionary effects that the CPP had 
on recipient banks, rather than on the behavioral changes that unassisted-but-sound banks 
made due to bailout expectations. In their analysis, the authors found that both market 
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share and market power, defined as local market share of assets and Lerner Index value, 
increased significantly for recipients of CPP capital. This effect was most pronounced for 
banks that repaid their capital quickly (Berger and Roman 2013, 19–20). The authors 
concluded by saying that, to encourage lending, future CPP-like interventions should be 
targeted more to smaller banks to avoid distortionary effects. However, from a financial-
stability perspective, they cautioned, larger banks would presumably see a larger benefit 
(Berger and Roman 2013, 30). 
Bank and Borrower Stock Market Valuations 
 Equity market valuations of participating banks were also affected by their participation in 
TARP, as evidenced by the findings in Ng, Vasvari, and Wittenberg-Moerman (2015). The 
authors analyzed the amount of negative media coverage that the program got throughout 
its inception to the end of 2009 to determine how media sentiment affected bank stock 
valuations. While both non-CPP and CPP banks were affected by the negative coverage, the 
effect was more pronounced for CPP banks, despite them performing better during the 
program (Ng, Vasvari, and Wittenberg-Moerman 2015, 3–5). 
Veronesi and Zingales (2009) analyzed the overall economic impact of the program on the 
original $125 billion investment to the largest financial institutions and found that the total 
enterprise value increase was approximately $132 billion (Veronesi and Zingales 2009, 3, 
22). The cost of the plan, as estimated by the authors, was approximately $25 billion to $47 
billion, depending on if the FDIC’s debt guarantee program and deadweight losses are 
included (Veronesi and Zingales 2009, 3). The authors, through DCF analysis, determined 
that the cost of government intervention was 2.5% of enterprise value, compared to that of 
going through a potential bankruptcy, at 22% (Veronesi and Zingales 2009, 25–28). 
Norden, Roosenboom and Wang (2013) looked at market performance of borrowers that 
had significant relationships with participants in the CPP. According to the authors, firms 
that had lenders that obtained CPP capital “significantly benefit[ted] from the CPP infusions 
in their banks” (Norden, Roosenboom, and Wang 2013, 1636). They found that firms that 
were more leveraged, bank dependent, and more vulnerable to the effects of the crisis 
benefitted even more from having a bank that received government capital (Norden, 
Roosenboom, and Wang 2013, 1636–37). Finally, the authors showed that firms that were 
more financially distressed (measured by factors such as leverage ratio, profitability, etc.) 
and bank-dependent experienced significant positive increases in stock market valuations 
as a result of the CPP (Norden, Roosenboom, and Wang 2013, 1654–55). 
Recovery 
Berger and Roman (2014b) conducted an analysis on the influence of CPP on the 
performance of local market conditions, defined using variables such as net job creation 
per capita, bankruptcies (business and personal) per capita, and net hiring establishments 
per capita. The authors found that job creation and hiring establishments increased, while 
personal bankruptcies decreased after the injections had taken place (Berger and Roman 
2014, 20). In the four years after TARP was established (Q1 2009 to Q4 2012), the authors 
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found that, “for every 1,000 people, 19.48 jobs were created, 3.57 more establishments 
created jobs, and 1.29 personal bankruptcies were eliminated due to TARP” (Berger and 
Roman 2014, 20).  
Calomiris and Khan (2015) discussed alternative implementation strategies to TARP, 
especially with respect to its more controversial elements, such as the use of warrants, use 
of common dividends for users of the CPP, and executive compensation limits (Calomiris 
and Khan 2015, 73–74). The use of warrants, the authors felt, was counterproductive to 
TARP’s primary role of stabilizing the banking system, as warrants “discouraged private 
stock issuance by taking away some of the upside available to stockholders.” A reward 
system that benefitted banks that raised new private capital would have been more 
suitable (Calomiris and Khan 2015, 73). Additionally, the authors explained that common 
stock dividends should have been completely restricted, despite Treasury assertions that, 
had they done so, the largest banks (such as JP Morgan and Citigroup) might not have 
participated (Calomiris and Khan 2015, 73–74). Finally, executive compensation 
restrictions, despite being incorporated into TARP to help it pass, were associated with 
both less willingness on the part of banks to accept TARP funds as well as lower likelihood 
of acceptance into the CPP if a bank had a higher number of highly paid SEOs (Calomiris 
and Khan 2015, 74). 
Liu et al. (2014) discussed the impact of the CPP on the recovery participant banks through 
their change in common stock prices. In the period where they held CPP capital, 
participating banks that repaid the government’s investment by the end of 2010 obtained 
“significant abnormal returns of about 4.7 percent…” In the quarter after repayment, these 
institutions experienced significant wealth increases of $329 billion (Liu et al. 2013, 5049). 
Additionally, the authors found that increasing executive compensation restrictions played 
a significant role in increasing the probability of repayment (Liu et al. 2013, 5059). The 
authors linked these results with those from a dynamic recovery model which stated that 
“recovering CPP banks that repaid TARP obligations tended to have stronger overall 
financial condition, as reflected in higher capital, asset quality, dividends, liquidity, and size, 
than non-recovering CPP banks,” leading the authors to conclude that “TARP was 
instrumental in fostering the financial and stock price recoveries of CPP banks” (Liu et al. 
2013, 5049). 
The overall impact of the Capital Purchase Program, after analyzing the literature, suggests 
that the immediate stabilizing impact of the program was clear. In a report published a year 
after TARP was passed, SIGTARP explained that after reaching its highest point of 341 basis 
points on October 13, 2008, “the LIBOR-OIS spread [fell] sharply, indicating that credit 
markets, although still not at normal levels, are now working better than before the 
government capital injections” (SIGTARP 2009b, 10). The decision to use capital injections 
was informed by the fact that the government would not have had time to value the 
troubled assets and, even if they did, $700 billion would not have been enough to stabilize 
the market (SIGTARP 2009b, 12). In a retrospective analysis on the CPP, some of its key 
architects said that, while the CPP alone did not fully recapitalize or stabilize the financial 
system, it provided “a key and necessary cornerstone to restore the banking system—and 
the broader economy—to normal functioning” (Jester, Nason, and Norton 2020, 224). 
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Without the CPP, hey said, the Fed’s stress tests and the subsequent private recapitalization 
would not have been successful. 
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Department of the Treasury. December 9, 2009.  
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(Treasury 2008c) U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). 2008c. “Treasury 
Announces TARP Capital Purchase Program Description.” Press Release, October 14, 2008.  
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(SIGTARP 2015) Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief 
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(Ng, Vasvari, and Wittenberg-Moerman 2015) Ng, Tee Yong Jeffrey, Florin P. Vasvari, and 
Regina Wittenberg-Moerman. 2015. “Media Coverage and the Stock Market Valuation of 
TARP Participating Banks.” Singapore Management University. March 2015.  
Examines the impact of media coverage of the CPP under TARP on the equity market 
valuation of participating banks’ holding companies.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17997. 
(Norden, Roosenboom, and Wang 2013) Norden, Lars, Peter Roosenboom, and Teng Wang. 
2013. “The Impact of Government Intervention in Banks on Corporate Borrowers’ Stock 
Returns.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48 (5): 1635–62. October 2013.  
Investigates whether and how government interventions in the U.S. banking sector influenced 
the stock market performance of corporate borrowers during the financial crisis of 2007-09. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17998. 
(Puddu and Walchli 2014)  Puddu, Stefano, and Andreas Walchli. 2014. “TARP Effect on 
Bank Lending Behaviour: Evidence from the Last Financial Crisis.” University of Neuchatel: 
Institute of Economic Research Working Paper, April.  
Measures whether banks that benefited from TARP increased small business loan 
originations.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/18014. 
(Veronesi and Zingales 2009) Veronesi, Pietro, and Luigi Zingales. 2009. “Paulson’s Gift.” 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Series, October.   
Calculates the costs and benefits of the largest ever US government intervention in the 









Appendix A: Timeline of events 
July 30, 2008:  The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA) is 
passed, which established the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA) and gave Treasury the authority to place the 
government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac into conservatorship. 
September 7, 2008:  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are placed into conservatorship. 
Treasury announces 1) preferred stock purchase agreements to 
ensure that the GSEs “maintain a positive net worth” and to 
support market stability, 2) a secured lending facility for the 
GSE’s and Federal Home Loan Banks to act as a liquidity 
backstop, and 3) a program to temporarily purchase mortgage-
backed securities issued by GSEs. 
September 15, 2008:  Lehman Brothers files for bankruptcy. Bank of America 
purchases Merrill Lynch for $50 billion.  
September 21, 2008:  The Federal Reserve Board approves the applications of 
investment banks Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to 
become bank holding companies, allowing them to access 
Federal Reserve liquidity facilities. 
September 29, 2008:  The first vote on the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
(EESA) fails in the House of Representatives, with a vote of 205-
228. 
October 3, 2008:  EESA is signed into law. Work on the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program (TARP) begins, with the government having access to 
the first of two $350 billion tranches of appropriated funds. 
Wells Fargo announces proposal to acquire Wachovia. 
October 14, 2008:  Treasury announces proposal to use TARP funds to purchase 
preferred equity in financial institutions through the $250 
billion Capital Purchase Program (CPP). Nine large, systemically 
significant financial institutions pledged to subscribe to the 
program for $125 billion. The deadline to apply was November 
14, 2008. 
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November 17, 2008:  Treasury announces CPP terms for non-publicly traded banks 
and trusts. The deadline to apply was December 8, 2008. 
January 12, 2009:  President Bush submits report to Congress requesting 
disbursement of the remaining $350 billion in TARP funds to be 
used by the incoming Obama administration. 
January 14, 2009: Treasury announces CPP terms for S-corporations. The deadline 
to apply was February 13, 2009. 
February 17, 2009:  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) 
is passed. In addition to large amounts of stimulus spending and 
tax cuts, ARRA also broadened the original executive 
compensation restrictions for TARP recipients that came with 
EESA.  
February 25, 2009:  Federal bank regulators, such as the FDIC, OCC, and Federal 
Reserve Board announce their intent to begin stress testing U.S. 
bank holding companies with assets exceeding $100 billion.  
April 14, 2009: Treasury announces CPP terms for mutual banks. The deadline 
to apply was April 7, 2009. 
May 7, 2009:  Results of the series of stress tests for 19 large financial 
institutions announced on February 25, called the Supervisory 
Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), are released, which show a 
$75 billion capital shortfall in 10 institutions. The nine SCAP 
institutions that did not need more capital and also participated 
in the CPP repaid the government’s investment.  
June 10, 2009:  Treasury releases its Interim Final Rule on TARP Standards for 
Compensation and Corporate Governance. The rule 
implemented and further expanded the restrictions laid out in 
ARRA, as well as appointed a Special Master for TARP Executive 
Compensation, who was responsible for reviewing 
compensation plans for institutions receiving “exceptional 
assistance,” among other things. 
December 9, 2009:  In a letter to Congress, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner outlines 
Treasury’s exit strategy for TARP, as well as its areas of focus for 
the following year. Additionally, the program’s authority would 
be extended from December 31, 2009, to October 3, 2010. 
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February 3, 2010: Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI) is created 
with the goal of providing financing to institutions that service 
low-income, minority, and underserviced communities. CPP 
institutions were able to refinance their investment into CDCI 
capital. 
July 21, 2010: The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 is passed. The Act included the “Pay it Back Act,” 
which decreased the maximum TARP authorization, removed 
Treasury’s ability to reuse TARP funds, and prevented TARP 
funds from being used on programs that were created after June 
25, 2010. 
September 27, 2010: The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 is passed, establishing the 
Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF), which provided capital 
injections to financial institutions with assets of less than $10 
billion to increase the availability of credit to small businesses.  
October 3, 2010: Purchasing authority under TARP officially expires, signaling the 
beginning of the wind-down phase of the program. 
December 10, 2010: Citigroup repays its $25 billion in CPP capital, making it the last 
of the nine systemically important financial institutions that 
received $125 billion in CPP capital to repay the government’s 
investment. 
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